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Procedural Rules or Procedural
Pretexts?: A Case Study of Procedural
Hurdles in Constitutional Challenges
to the Texas Sodomy Law
BY CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE*
INTRODUCTION
rocedural rules serve many functions in the American judicial
system. While some address such mundane issues as font size in
briefs, other procedural rules essentially regulate access to
American courts. Procedural rules on intervention determine who may enter
an existing case; conversely, rules governing dismissal may permit a party
to exit a case before any decision is reached on the merits. Procedural rules
such as standing and mootness limit who may make a particular legal
argument. While substantive law defines the scope of constitutional,
statutory, and common law rights and obligations, procedural rules can
indirectly affect substantive rights by determining who can advance certain
legal positions in court. Although procedural rules are theoretically
neutral-and should not favor one set of legal advocates over an-
other-procedural rules are also subject to manipulation. This Article
discusses the role of procedural rules in legal challenges to the Texas
sodomy law and suggests that, in some instances, courts appear to apply
procedural doctrines in a manner that effectively deprives gay Americans
of meaningful access to courts. While the procedural decision in each
individual case may be defensible, taking the cases as a whole, a pattern
emerges: even though trial courts have often held that the Texas sodomy
" Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A. 1986,
University of California, Los Angeles; M.P.P. 1988, Harvard University, Kennedy
School of Government; J.D. 1993, University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall
School of Law. The author wishes to thank Tony Reese and Jeffrey Sherman for
their criticisms of'previous drafts. All remaining mistakes and omissions belong to
the author alone.
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law is unconstitutional, appellate courts consistently invoke procedural
rules to reverse these victories. While it is impossible to prove that judges
are intentionally manipulating procedural rules to disadvantage gay-rights
advocates, much evidence points in that direction.
Part I of this Article explains the increasing importance of procedural
rules' in the movement toward greater equality between gay and straight
Americans. Mastering the procedural rules of American courts had low
pragmatic value to gay citizens and their legal advocates for the first seven
decades of the twentieth century. During this era, the participation of open
homosexuals in American courts was traditionally confined to playing the
role of the defendant in criminal matters. Homosexuals rarely won their
cases. In response to their fears of a hostile judiciary, gay men and lesbians
rarely initiated litigation to establish or protect their civil rights. As judges
became more educated about homosexuality, relevant substantive law
improved significantly. This, in turn, increased the importance of proce-
dural rules in the march toward equality. In many jurisdictions, procedural
rules have joined inadequate substantive law as a major obstacle to gay
Americans achieving full citizenship.
To illustrate the role of procedural rules in the legal battle for greater
equality, Part II presents a case study of legal challenges to the Texas
sodomy law. The Texas sodomy law criminalizes private, non-commercial
sodomy between consenting gay adults. The Texas legislature, courts,
police departments, schools, social workers, and private organizations have
all relied on the Texas sodomy law to justify discrimination against gay
Texans. In litigation challenging the Texas sodomy law, at least six
different courts-both federal and state-have held that the Texas sodomy
statute unconstitutionally infringes on individual privacy rights. Yetthe law
remains in place because every decision that invalidated the law was met
with a procedural maneuver-including Younger abstention doctrine, the
intervention of improper parties, and the denial of standing on appeal to
victorious parties below-that limited or eliminated any substantive ruling
against the Texas sodomy law. A chronological examination of court
challenges to the Texas sodomy statute demonstrates how some judges
have employed procedural rules to keep the Texas sodomy law in place.
Finally, Part III explains why the Texas case study does not reflect an
isolated anomaly. Courts in most states with sodomy laws have employed
'This case study uses the term "procedural rules" broadly to include all rules
unrelated to the substantive merits of a case. Thus, Younger abstention, standing
doctrine, and the dismissal of parties are considered procedural issues because they
are generally independent of a litigant's substantive legal claims.
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the procedural rules of standing to prevent litigants from challenging
sodomy statutes as violative of state constitutional privacy rights. These
examples confirm the growing importance of procedural rules in gay-rights
litigation.
I. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF PROCEDURAL RULES
IN LITIGATION AFFECTING GAY AMERICANS
During the post-war era, most procedural rules governing access to
courts were largely irrelevant to gay Americans. Gay defendants wanted
desperately to avoid time in the courtroom. Most gay men and lesbians
would not defend themselves against criminal charges-no matter how
trumped up-because they could not risk the notoriety of a trial.2 In
criminal cases, the trial was as much about shaming the defendant for his
sexual orientation as it was about applying the law Not surprisingly, gay
people did not generally initiate civil litigation to protect their rights.!
Despite the plethora of laws condemning homosexuals,- most gay
Americans were loath to challenge the statutes and policies that damned
them to second-class, and often criminal, status. Substantive law rarely
protected homosexuals.6 No level of government had yet enacted any
specific statutory protections for homosexuals as a group. Even when
employers violated due process to rid themselves of gay employees, few
gay people dared try to enforce their rights in court.7
In addition to inadequate substantive law, gay Americans also lacked
any meaningful infrastructure of legal advocacy. Although civil rights
attorneys were actively pursuing equality for African-Americans,' the
1950s concept of civil rights did not include protection for homosexuals.
2 See GARY DAVID COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN
13 (1991).
3 JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 15 (1983) ("Court
proceedings seemed designed to instill feelings of shame and obliterate self-
esteem.").
I There were some exceptions that proved the rule. See DUDLEY CLENDINEN &
ADAMNAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD 16 (1999).
5 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAY LAW (1999).
6 See CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 4, at 21.
7See Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities ofthe Homosexual,
82HARv.L. REv. 1738,1746 (1969) ("[V]ery few cases concerning homosexuality
reach the courts [because flear of publicity may keep nonprofessed homosexual
workers from risking even administrative review.").
'See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Edue., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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For example, in 1957, the American Civil Liberties Union board of
directors adopted a national policy statement that sodomy statutes were
constitutional.9 Compounding the absence of organized legal advocacy
organizations was the dearth of individual attorneys willing to represent gay
clients. While gay attorneys would seem a natural fit for gay clients, openly
gay attorneys could not practice law in many jurisdictions. 0
Gay men and lesbians began initiating litigation after the Stonewall
riots of 1969 in Greenwich Village." Emboldened by the Stonewall
rebellion, gay activists formed the radical Gay Liberation Front, which later
spun-off the more formal and structured Gay Activists Alliance." These
gay rights groups were in a much better position to advocate for gay rights,
including holding demonstrations against anti-gay laws, 3 lobbying
politicians, 4 and going to court. 5
Represented by effective advocates in the 1970s and 1980s, gay
Americans in greater numbers began to fight successfully for
employment 16 for custody of their children,'" and for their rights.'s Perhaps
9
"Homosexuality and Civil Liberties: Policy statementAdoptedby the Union's
Board of Directors, January 7, 1957'" Civil Liberties: Monthly Publication of the
ACLU, March 1957, no. 150, quoted in RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYs/JusTICE: A
STUDY OF ETHICs, SOCIETY, AND LAW 49 (1988).
'oSee, e.g., Florida Bar v. Kay, 232 So. 2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1970); see also State
ex rel. Florida Bar v. Kimball, 96 So. 2d 825, 825 (Fla. 1957) (citing Florida's
sodomy law to disbar attorney); In re Boyd, 307 P.2d 625, 625 (Cal. 1957) (citing
moral turpitude law to disbar attorney).
1 CLENDINEN & NAGOuRNEY, supra note 4, at 12.
d1I at 50. Before these organizations, no group dared use the word "gay" in
its title. Id at 31.
13 Id at 38.
141d at51.
15 See, e.g., Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 320 N.Y.S.2d 994, 996-96
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971), rev'd, Owles v. Lomenzo, 329 N.Y.S.2d 181 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1972), af'd, 341 N.Y.S.2d 108 (N.Y. 1973). The new groups also tried to
advise gay citizens oftheir legal rights. See CLENDINEN&NAGOURNEY, supra note
4, at 60.
16 See Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1508 (1989); see,
e.g., Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Kan. 1991); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. &
Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
7 See generally Stephen B. Pershing, Entreat Me Not to Leave Thee: Bottoms
v. Bottoms and the Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 3 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 289 (1994); Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal
Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799
(1979); Steve Susoeff, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay
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the brightest spot in this era was the litigation brought by gay student
organizations against major public universities across the country) 9 Of
course, advocates of equal rights for gay Americans suffered many
defeats, 0 the most significant being the Supreme Court's condemnation of
homosexuals as criminals in Bowers v. Hardwick." Nevertheless,
commentators perceive a judicial trend toward endorsing gay rights.'
Largely due to the success of these legal challenges in the 1970s and
1980s, procedural rules became more important. When civil rights
attorneys could clear the procedural hurdles, substantive victory was
possible. Conversely, failure to navigate the procedural minefield had the
same immediate practical effect as a complete loss on the merits: the anti-
gay law remained enforceable.
Although the judicial system is traveling in the correct direction, it is
still a long distance from the destination of truly even-handed treatment of
gay litigants. While it is impossible to provide a comprehensive analysis of
the relationship between gay people and the American court system, several
observations appear correct. In the post-WWII era, procedural rules bore
little significance because gay people were generally reluctant to acknowl-
edge their sexual orientation in court and demand equal treatment.
Historically, few gay Americans would initiate civil rights litigation. In the
civil rights era following the Stonewall riots, however, gay people became
willing to come forward and plead their cases.'
Greater use of courts by gay Americans, and the corresponding
expansion and improvement in substantive law that defined the legal rights
of gay men and lesbians, increased the importance of access to courts and
or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852 (1985);
Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships:An Equal Protection
Analysis, 102 HARV. L. REv. 617 (1989);.
"' See generally Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference
Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 311,327 (1980-81).
19See, e.g., Gay Student Servs. v. Tex. A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1323 (5th
Cir. 1984); Gay Lib v. Univ. of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977); Gay Students
Org. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir. 1974); Student Coalition for Gay
Rights v. Austin Peay State Univ., 477 F. Supp. 1267, 1269 (M.D. Tenn. 1979);
Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543, 545-46 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
2oSee, e.g., Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding the CIA's
right to fire a gay employee).
21 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2 Joan Biskupic, Gay RightsActivists Seek a Supreme Court Test Case, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 19, 1993, at Al.
' See CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 4, at 15-16.
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therefore those courts' procedural rules regarding such access. If opponents
of treating gay Americans with respect and humanity were able to
manipulate procedural rules, the effect could resemble the openly hostile
court system that had deterred gay people from going to court at all (in the
post-war era) or the lack of favorable substantive law (in the early civil
rights era). Like all litigants, attorneys advocating gay civil rights require
a level playing field with rules that are known and evenly applied. Yet, as
the following case study suggests, courts may not be applying procedural
rules uniformly and appear to manipulate them in a manner that denies gay
Americans equal access to justice.
II. A CASE STUDY iN PROCEDURAL HURDLES:
TEXAS SODOMY LAW LITIGATIoN
A case study of litigation challenging the constitutionality of the Texas
sodomy law illustrates the role of procedural rules in hampering legal
efforts to achieve greater equality for gay Americans. Both components of
the case study's subject-sodomy laws and Texas-are good candidates for
analysis. Sodomy laws continue to represent the archetypal anti-gay law.
Although sodomy laws originally proscribed all anal inter-
course-homosexual or heterosexual---current sodomy laws are either
explicitly limited to same-sex conduct or are commonly interpreted to
criminalize only homosexual activity.24 Along with religious dogma,
sodomy laws are a major cause of homophobia and discrimination against
gay Americans.'
The Texas sodomy law, in particular, makes an appropriate case study
for several reasons. Texas has a long history of interpreting, adjudicating,
and enforcing its sodomy law. In many instances, the decisions of Texas
courts have significantly influenced how other state courts interpret their
own state's sodomy statutes. Courts in Texas-both state and fed-
eral-have probably published more opinions regarding the constitutional-
ity of sodomy laws than courts in any other state. Finally, more judges in
Texas have held that the state sodomy law is unconstitutional than in any
other state, and yet, through the manipulation of procedural rules, the law
still remains valid and enforceable throughout most of the state.
To appreciate how the various legal challenges to the Texas sodomy
law proceeded requires understanding the organization of the Texas court
24 See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by
"Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 103 (2000).
25 See id at 122-68.
1114 [VOL. 89
TEXAS SODOMY LAW
system. The Texas judicial structure maintains two separate courts of last
resort: the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
The Texas Supreme Court represents the highest court for civil matters and
operates similarly to most state supreme courts. However, in contrast to
most other states, Texas maintains a separate court of last resort on criminal
matters, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 6 The Texas Supreme Court
cannot overrule the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals2 Either
court could, in theory, invalidate the Texas sodomy law as unconstitution-
al.
In addition to these two state courts, Texas hosts four federal judicial
districts. These federal district courts possess the authority to invalidate the
Texas sodomy law if the statute contravenes the federal constitution. On
appeal, either the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court could invalidate the
Texas sodomy law as violative of the U.S. Constitution.'
In sum, Texas is home to several distinct courts with the authority to
adjudicate the constitutionality of prohibitions against private sodomy
between consenting adults. In theory, this means that opponents of the
Texas sodomy law have three bites at the apple, three different courts of
last resort, any one of which could enjoin its enforcement. In practice, the
invocation of procedural rules has thwarted most attempts to challenge the
statute's constitutionality.
A. The Early Evolution of the Texas Sodomy Law
The State of Texas enacted its first sodomy law in 1860.29 Article 342
of the Texas Penal Code provided: "Whoever commits with mankind or
beast the abominable and detestable crime against nature shall be confined
in the penitentiary for not less than five nor more than fifteen years."' This
statute applied to sodomy between a man and a woman-whether married
to each other or not-as well as to homosexuals.31
2
' See State er rel. Wilson v. Briggs, 351 S.WM2d 892, 894 (Tex. Crim. App.
1961) ('Che Court of Criminal Appeals is the court of last resort in this state in
criminal matters.").
27 Id. ("[N]o other court ofthis state has authority to overrule or circumvent [the
Court of Criminal Appeals'] decisions, or disobey its mandates.").
2 See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
29Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1148 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
30 1860 Tex. Crim. Stat. art. 342.
31 See Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1148. Texas courts noted that women were
included within the term '"mankind" as that word was used within the sodomy
statute. Lewis v. State, 35 S.W. 372,372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1896).
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However, the penal code neglected to define any of the provision's
terms. This led to litigation in the late 1800s, as Texas courts-like most
state courts in jurisdictions with ambiguous sodomy statutes-attempted to
flesh out the precise parameters of the "crime against nature." Because the
1860 Texas legislature did not provide statutory definitions, Texas courts
turned to the common law. In an early opinion in the area, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals held that the common law crime of sodomy did not
include oral copulation.32 This opinion influenced other state courts to
interpret the common law similarly.
Two minor revisions of the Penal Code failed to clarify the statute's
reach. Between 1893 and 1896, Texas authorities revised its Penal Code
and renumbered the sodomy law as Article 364.34 But still the legislature
declined to define the prohibition's key terms. 35 In 1925, the Texas
legislature again reformed the Penal Code. Under the 1925 revision, the
sodomy prohibition was recodified as Article 524, but its text remained
unchanged.
36
While conceding that the Texas sodomy statute did not cover oral
sodomy, some Texas judges urged that "legislation should be enacted
covering these unnatural crimes." '3 Several other state legislatures had
32 Prindle v. State, 21 S.W. 360, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893).
33 William Eskridge calls Prindle the "leading case." William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Hardwick andHistoriography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631,657-58 (noting other state
courts following Prindle in interpreting their own sodomy laws).
34 1895 Tex. Crim. Stat. art. 364; see Lewis v. State, 35 S.W. 372 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1896).
31 The Texas statute was not alone in its obtuse language. See Jon J. Gallo et al.,
The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of
Enforcement andAdministration in Los Angeles County, 13 UCLA L. REV. 643,
677 (1966).36 See Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). However,
along with several other sexual prohibitions, the sodomy law was apparently
omitted from the enrolled bill that contained the Revised Penal Code of 1925. See
id at n.9. Judges considered the omission inadvertant and the laws still valid. See
Exparte Copeland, 91 S.W.2d 700, 702 (1936) ("To impute to the Legislature the
intent to repeal the statutes defining incest, bigamy, seduction, adultery, and
fornication is today at its door the charge of ignoring the moral sense of the people
of this state and striking down some of the strongest safeguards of the home. That
such was not the legislative intent is apparent from the enrolled bill."). Thus, the
sodomy prohibition remained the law. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121,1148
n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
17 Harvey v. State, 115 S.W. 1193, 1193 (Tex. 1909). While wanting the statute
to include oral sex, the court reported the mere subject of sodomy taboo and
considered "[t]he charge ... too horrible to contemplate and too revolting to
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already amended their "crime against nature" statutes to include oral
sodomy. 8 Some Texas courts noted with dismay that the Texas legislature
had repeatedly re-enacted the Texas sodomy law without amendment to
cover the additional act39 This effectively prevented state judges from
punishing the "vile and detestable... act" of oral sodomy. ° So long as oral
sodomy fell outside the common-law meaning of "sodomy," judges could
not vote their morality.
Finally, responding to numerous opinions that restricted the definition
of sodomy to anal intercourse, the 1943 Texas legislature significantly
amended its sodomy law to include oral sex.4! ' The new statute provided:
Whoever has carnal copulation with a beast, or in an opening ofthe body,
except sexual parts, with another human being, or whoever shall use his
mouth on the sexual parts of another human being for the purpose of
having carnal copulation, or who shall voluntarily permit the use of his
own sexual parts in a lewd or lascivious manner by any minor, shall be
guilty of sodomy, and upon conviction thereof shall be deemed guilty of
a felony, and shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two (2) nor
more than fifteen (15) years.42
With the 1943 amendment of Article 524, "the offense of sodomy was for
the first time fully defined by statute."43 Unconstrained by the common law
definition, Texas courts interpreted Article 524 broadly."
B. ConstitutionalAttacks Against Texas's Gender-Neutral Sodomy Law
Because the new sodomy law still applied to married couples as well
as to unmarried heterosexual and homosexual couples, Article 524
discuss." Id38See Eskridge, supra note 33, at 658.
Munoz v. State, 281 S.W. 857, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1926).40 Id
41 See Furstonburg v. State, 190 S.W.2d 362 (1945).
42 Pruett v. State of Texas, 463 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)
(quoting 1925 Tex. Crim. Stat. § 524 (as amended by 1943 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
ch. 112, § 1 (Vernon))).
' Slusser v. State, 232 S.W.2d 727,729 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950). In addition
to more clearly articulating the elements of criminal sodomy, the new statute also
reduced the minimum prison sentence from five to two years.
I See, e.g., Sinclair v. State, 311 S.W.2d 824, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958)
(holding penetration of the mouth not necessary).
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represented a gender-neutral statute. Thus, everyone in Texas who engaged
in oral sex was committing a felony. In practice, however, private,
consensual sodomy was functionally immune from prosecution due to the
difficulty of detecting such conduct. Texas police departments primarily
enforced the law in cases of public sodomy (where the police could observe
the conduct without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment) and forcible
sodomy (where a complaining witness could testify against the defendant
regardless of where the sodomy took place). Although the possibility of
prosecution remained remote, many Texans who engaged in private
sodomy believed Article 524 to be unconstitutional and sought an
opportunity to make their case in court. In most cases, the invocation of
procedural rules protected the statute from invalidation.
1. Buchanan v. Batchelor
In the first major challenge to Article 524's constitutionality, federal
procedural rules rescued the law from defeat. Although the Texas
legislature enacted its expanded sodomy law in 1943, not until the late
1960s did a gay man launch a major challenge to the law's constitutional-
ity.45 This was consistent with the nationwide reticence of gay men and
lesbians to appear in court."
Alvin Buchanan initiated the modem era of constitutional challenges
to the Texas sodomy statute after Dallas police had arrested him on two
separate occasions for engaging in sodomy with another adult male in
public restrooms.47 After he was charged with the crime of sodomy,
Buchanan sought relief from the federal courts. He requested that a three-
judge court be designated in the Northern District of Texas for the purposes
of declaring Article 524 unconstitutional and enjoining the state's
prosecution of him under the statute.48
Once designated, the three-judge panel granted leave for three
additional individuals to intervene in pursuit of a permanent injunction
against enforcement of Article 524.49 Michael and Jannet Gibson were a
4' Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated and
remanded, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
46 See COMSTOCK, supra note 2, at 13.
4 Buchanan, 308 F. Supp. at 730. For the circumstances of each arrest, see
infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (discussing Buchanan arrests in greater
detail).
4' Buchanan, 308 F. Supp. at 730.49Id.
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married couple who argued that Buchanan would not adequately repre-
sent the privacy rights of married people who, like the Gibsons, engaged
in private sodomy and feared prosecution under the law. Similarly,
Travis Lee Strickland, agay man, intervened because, he argued, Buchanan
-who was twice arrested for what was arguably public sodomylq-- -
did not represent the interests of gay men, like Strickland, who engaged
only in private sodomy. The participation of the intervenors seemed
prudent in light ofthe standing issues. Because Buchanan had been arrested
for public sodomy, his case presented a "serious question" as to whether he
had standing to assert the constitutional rights of married couples and
individuals who engaged only in private sodomy. 1 The court considered
the arrival of the Gibsons and Strickland to solve all standing problems,
thus allowing the court to evaluate the merits of the constitutional
argument.
2
After analyzing Griswold, its progeny, relevant analogous case law, and
the Model Penal Code, the three-judge panel declared Article 524
unconstitutionally overbroad because it reached "the private, consensual
acts of married couples."'53 As a result, although the court did not hold that
the federal right to privacy applied to same-sex sodomy, the judges
nonetheless declared the Texas sodomy law void on its face and therefore
made the law unenforceable against gay couples as well. The court
permanently enjoined the Dallas district attorney from enforcing Article
524. 4
5 For discussion of the public versus private nature of Buchanan's conduct, see
infra notes 92-101and accompanying text.
51 Buchanan, 308 F. Supp. at 731.
2 Id. Before addressing the substantive merits of the legal arguments against
the Texas sodomy law, the court also addressed the defendants' comity argument
against federal intervention. The Buchanan panel declined to abstain from deciding
the issue of Article 524's constitutionality until Texas courts were afforded an
opportunity to construe the statute and to adjudicate its constitutionality. The
federal judges so held for two reasons:
first, because there is no prospect of the immediate availability of a state
forum where the questions raised here could be litigated which is
particularly significant given the operation of an alleged overbroad statute
on First Amendment rights .... and, second, because there exists in Article
524 no question of statutory interpretation for which the courts of this State
would be of assistance in resolving.
Id (citations omitted).
53 Id at 735.
1Id at 736.
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Result: The Texas sodomy law appears to be unenforceable, at least in
Dallas.55
2. Pruett v. State
While Buchanan was winding its way through the federal courts,
Johnnie Pruett launched his own attack in state court against the Texas
sodomy law.56 Pruett, an eighteen-year old, confessed to committing
forcible sodomy against another male student 57 Pruett pled nolo conten-
dere, but upon conviction argued that Article 524 was unconstitutionally
overbroad because it outlawed private sodomy between a consenting
husband and wife. 8
The judges of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals first suggested that
enforcement against married couples acting in private raised no problems
as a matter of practice. If the sodomy were private, the court reasoned, then
no witness could testify against the couple.59 Furthermore, if the sodomy
were truly consensual, then neither spouse could testify against the other
pursuant to evidentiary privilege.6' Based upon these practical limitations
on successful prosecution, the judges seemed little surprised "that no case
had been found where a husband or wife was convicted for the offense of
sodomy for a private consensual act between the spouses."6 ' Indeed,
because the likelihood of a conviction was "no more than 'conceivable,' ,,62
the constitutional issues seemed largely academic to the panel.
Despite the court's logic that Article 524 could hardly affect the rights
of married couples, the Texas judges still had to wrestle with the holding
of a federal opinion that had just invalidated the law and had enjoined the
Dallas district attorney from enforcing it.63 The Texas court solved the
problem by declining to follow Buchanan for four asserted reasons: the
decision in Buchanan was not final;" state courts "are not bound by rulings
5 The result is only apparent because a procedural maneuver later eliminated
the victory. See infranotes 75-81. The district attorney appealed the decision to the
United States Supreme Court.56 Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).57 Id at 192.
58 Id at 193.
59 Id60 Id
61 Id
62 Id
6' See id at 192-93.
641d at 194.
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of lower federal courts on Federal Constitutional questions";' "[t]he
question of whether the sodomy statute may be invoked against married
couples for private consensual acts has never been presented to this court
in an appeal from such a conviction";66 and, finally, Griswold does not
apply to sodomy statutes.67 IgnoringBuchanan's analysis on privacy rights,
the court concluded that Article 524 was constitutional.6" The court claimed
to distinguish Griswold because, while the Griswold Court found a birth
control statute to be "offensive," the judges in Pruet found the act of
sodomy to be "offensive." (How this constitutes a legal distinction
sufficient to justify limiting an individual's constitutional right to privacy
is never explained.) More importantly, the court seemed to employ a
balancing test, whereby the court's desire to maintain the state sodomy
statute was weighed against the low probability that the sodomy statute
would interfere with consensual conduct in the marital bed. The court
opined:
To extend the protection of this right of privacy to destroy the sodomy
statute, when successfulprosecution of private consensual acts of sodomy
are at most only "conceivable" is not, in our view, consistent with the
description of the marriage relationships and the right of privacy
described by Mr. Justice Douglas [in Griswold].7°
Despite its reference.to Griswold, the court engaged in absolutely no
discussion about the origins, contours, or purposes of constitutional privacy
rights.
The court affirmed Pruett's conviction.7' However, the ultimate holding
initially appeared to be more limited than a blanket endorsement of the
statute's constitutionality. In later reviewing Pruett's sentence,' the court
65 Id.
66 Id
67 Id at 194-95.
6 Id
69 d at 195.70 Id
71 Id at 197.
' Having lost his appeal, Johnnie Pruett came before the Court of Criminal
Appeals again concerning his sentencing. Vance v. Clawson, 465 S.W.2d 164
(Tex. Crim. App. 1971). Pruett had been sentenced to confinement for two years,
but the trial judge had credited Pruett for time served in custody before sentencing
and had allowed for"good time" credit. Representing the state, the district attorney
sued the trial judge to obtain a Writ of Prohibition from the Court of Criminal
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noted: "Pruett's conviction was afftned on appeal, with this court
upholding the constitutionality of Article 524 as toforcible sodomy despite
the holding in Buchanan v. Batchelor that such statute was 'void on its face
for unconstitutional overbreath [sic].' " The court itself thus seemed to
suggest that its Pruett holding did not evaluate Article 524 as applied to
private, consensual sodomy. Subsequent decisions, though, ignored the
court's language that appeared to limit Pruett's holding to instances of
forcible sodomy.74
Result: A three-judge federal court has held that the Texas sodomy law
on its face violates the U.S. Constitution. A state appellate court has upheld
the law "as [applied] to forcible sodomy." Article 524's constitutionality
is in doubt. The law is unenforceable in Dallas pursuant to a federal
injunction. The law appears enforceable elsewhere, at least in some
circumstances.
3. Wade v. Buchanan
Direct appeal of Buchanan's case was still pending before the Supreme
Court when the Texas state court issued its opinion in Pruett.' Henry
Wade-the Dallas District Attorney whom the Buchanan panel had
enjoined from enforcing Article 524-had appealed the panel's decision.
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the panel's opinion and remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of the Younger abstention doctrine.76
The Younger abstention doctrine "provides that federal equitable relief is
generally unavailable against pending state criminal prosecutions except in
Appeals. While affirming the pre-sentence custody credit, the appellate court
ordered the judge to set aside the "good time" credit. Id at 169.
In response to Pruett's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the federal district
judge held that Pruett was entitled to good time credit. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
upheld the district court's decision and chastised the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals for shooting "wide of the mark." Pruett v. State, 468 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir.
1972), aff'd en banc, 470 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1973). Holding that the Texas court
had violated Pruett's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, the
Fifth Circuit ordered that Pruett be released. Id. at 54.
7 Vance, 465 S.W.2d at 166 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
74 See, e.g., Lee v. State, 505 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Turner
v. State, 497 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
75 See Kemp v. State, 464 S.W.2d 141, 145 n.1 (Onion, J., dissenting) (Tex.
Crim. App..1971).
76 Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971) (citing Youngerv. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971), and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971)).
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narrowly defined and unusual circumstances.' Younger abstention did not
exist when the three-judge panel decided Buchanan over a year before
Younger. In short, the Supreme Court had created a new procedural barrier
and applied it against Buchanan, thus depriving him of a favorable
substantive ruling.
At least one federal judge has strongly questioned the Court's
invocation of Younger in disposing of the appeal in Buchanan.78 The
Younger abstention doctrine counsels federal courts not to enjoin pending
state criminal prosecutions, unless extraordinary circumstances are present.
While the state had initiated a prosecution against Buchanan, this federal
suit provided the only meaningful opportunity for married couples (like the
Gibsons) and gay men who engaged only in private sodomy (like Strick-
land) to challenge the sodomy law's constitutionality. The three-judge
panel in Buchanan had specifically noted the absence of criminal prosecu-
tions against private, consensual sodomy.79 Although Buchanan could make
constitutional arguments at his trial, neither the Gibsons nor Strickland
could intervene in the defendant's criminal trial. Thus, with the opinion
vacated, the Gibsons and Strickland had no forum in which to assert their
federal constitutional rights.'
Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court vacated
Buchanan on procedural grounds-and did not discuss the legal merits
of the three-judge panel's decision to invalidate the Texas sodomy
law-the Court's move seemed to strip the lower court's opinion of even
its persuasive authority in Texas. After the Court vacated the panel
decision, Texas state courts disregarded the original panel's opinion in
Buchanan."1
Result. Although a federal court held Article 524 unconstitutional on
the merits, a new procedural rule scuttles the opinion's binding and
persuasive authority. Given the vacatur of Buchanan and the state court's
"Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1995) (footnote omitted).
78 See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1136 n.40 (N.D. Tex. 1982)
(criticizing the use of Younger abstention in Buchanan).
79Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729, 731 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
80 If they attempted to initiate their own declaratory judgment action (without
an underlying criminal prosecution), the suit would most likely have been
dismissed for lack of standing, another procedural obstacle. See Christopher t.
Leslie, Standing in the Way of Equality: How States Use Standing Doctrine to
Insulate Sodomy Laws From Constitutional Attack, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 29.
81 See, e.g., Lee v. State, 505 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Turner
v. State, 497 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Everette v. State, 465
S.W.2d 162, 162-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
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ill-reasoned opinion in Pruett, the Texas sodomy law is enforceable
throughout the state.
4. Dawson v. Vance
The Supreme Court's vacatur order prevented Buchanan from pursuing
his constitutional argument in federal court until after his case had finished
winding its way through the state court system. Meanwhile, James Dawson
had pursued a path similar to Alvin Buchanan's. After being arrested for
sodomy,82 Dawson requested the designation of a three-judge federal panel
to evaluate Article 524's constitutionality. A three-judge panel was
convened, then dismissed. 3 As in Buchanan, a married heterosexual couple
(who only engaged in private, consensual sodomy) intervened to represent
the privacy rights of similarly situated Texans. Here the similarities
between Buchanan and Dawson end.
As this judge heard the plaintiffs' claims after the Supreme Court's
decision in Wade v. Buchanan," he refused to fully entertain the substan-
tive legal arguments of Dawson and the intervenors. 5 The court disposed
of the case on procedural grounds.8 6 Given the advent of Younger absten-
tion and the Supreme Court's remand in Buchanan, the judge dismissed the
case on Younger grounds and, for extra measure, also denied standing.8"
Result: Article 524 is enforceable, in part, because procedural rules
have prevented any federal challenge to the Texas sodomy law.
5. Pruett and the Supreme Court
Johnnie Pruett played by the new rules of Younger. He waited for the
state court system to pronounce his guilt and sentence him. He then
2 Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971). Dawson allegedly
committed sodomy with a minor. Id. at 1322. As such, his conduct was clearly not
constitutionally protected; he would have to rely on an overbreadth argument.
I This three-judge panel was in the Southern District of Texas, while the
Buchanan panel sat in Texas's Northern District.
u Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
85Dawson, 329 F. Supp. at 1321.
86id
" The judge dismissed the case on Younger grounds, then went ahead and
published (without alteration) the opinion that he had written several months before
the Supreme Court had announced the Younger doctrine and vacated the Buchanan
opinion. Dawson, 329 F. Supp. at 1322. Given the dismissal based on Younger, the
entire remaining opinion appears to be dicta.
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appealed his conviction and challenged the constitutionality of Article 524
in federal court. Although he argued that the sodomy law violated the
federal constitutional right to privacy-the precise argument that the three-
judge federal panel articulated when it enjoined the Dallas district attorney
from enforcing Article 524---the Supreme Court refused to evaluate the
law's constitutionality. Despite the fact that Pruett's argument was based
on the federal Constitution, the Supreme Court dismissed the case "for
want of a substantial federal question."" This seems surprising given that
just the year before a three-judge federal panel had held this same law
unconstitutional. 9
Result. Unchanged. After forbidding federal courts from evaluating the
constitutionality of Article 524 before a criminal case has been fully
prosecuted in the appropriate state courts, the Supreme Court three weeks
later' refuses to consider the constitutionality of that same law (although
it initially granted certiorari) even after the state courts have convicted and
sentenced the defendant under that statute.
6. Buchanan: Back to the State Courts
His initial federal victory vacated by the Supreme Court, Alvin
Buchanan found himself back before the Texas courts." By the time that
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals weighed in, Buchanan had been
convicted of two separate counts of sodomy, both in public restrooms, one
in a local park and one in a Sears store. 2 The lower court had sentenced
Buchanan to two five-year terms of imprisonment, to run concurrently.93
Noting the Supreme Court's vacatur of Buchanan's federal litigation,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Buchanan's constitutional
attack on the Texas sodomy law. 4 The court ignored the federal district
court's opinion inBuchanan v. Batchelor, which had enjoined enforcement
of Article 524 after thoroughly analyzing the doctrine of constitutional
Pruett v. Texas, 402 U.S. 902 (1971).
89Despite his losses, Pruett did not lack tenacity. That summer of 1971, the
Court denied Pruett's application for a stay, Pruett v. Texas, 402 U.S. 939 (1971),
reapplication for a stay, 402 U.S. 1007 (1971), and a petition for rehearing, 403
U.S. 912 (1971).
90 The Court vacated Wade v. Buchanan on March 29, 1971 and dismissed
Pruett on April 19, 1971. Pruett v. Texas, 402 U.S. 902 (1971).
9' Buchanan v. State, 471 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
92Id. at 403.
93 1d
94Id.
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privacy and had been reversed purely on procedural grounds. Instead, the
court engaged in no discussion of constitutional privacy, but merely cited
Pruett,95 which itself presented a cursory (three-sentence) discussion on
constitutional privacy. Furthermore, the court ignored the fact that Pruett's
sodomy was forcible, whereas Buchanan had engaged in consensual
sodomy.
However, the court treated Buchanan's two episodes of sodomy quite
differently. Having failed to persuade the court that the statute itself
violated his constitutional right to privacy, Buchanan argued that the
evidence used to convict him had been obtained in violation of his Fourth
Amendment privacy rights.' Because the restroom stalls in Sears were
equipped with individual doors, the police observed Buchanan's activities
from a "concealed position above the men's restroom." 7 Police used the
same method of clandestine surveillance in the park restroom, but the court
found a critical distinction: the stalls there did not have doors.' Because
the restroom stall at Sears had a door that locked from the inside, the court
concluded that Buchanan had a reasonable expectation of privacy."
Therefore, the evidence for that sodomy charge had been illegally obtained;
the conviction was reversed and remanded. In contrast, because the
commode stalls at the park had no such doors, Buchanan had no reasonable
expectation of privacy.°" Thus, this conviction was affirmed and Buchanan
was still sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment.1°1
The rote allegiance of the Court of Criminal Appeals to Pruett became
the court's modus operandi for handling constitutional attacks against the
Texas sodomy law. Subsequent cases essentially refused to entertain
arguments regarding the constitutionality of Article 524, dismissing such
arguments based on the authority of Pruett without any discussion
951Id at 403.
9Id at 404.97 1d
9 8 Id
99Id
100 Id; see State v. Brown, 929 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. App. 1996); cf State v.
Limberhand, 788 P.2d 857 (Id. App. 1990) (discussing Fourth Amendment
distinctions based on restroom stall design). Although invoking privacy-related
rights, the court decided the case on Fourth Amendment grounds. The court did not
recognize any constitutional right to privacy apart from the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches. See Cammack v. State, 641 S.W.2d 906,
909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) ("The court decided Buchanan on Fourth Amendment
grounds.").
101 Buchanan, 471 S.W.2d at 404.
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whatsoever." Although a three-judge federal panel had held the law
unconstitutional and enjoined the state's prosecution of Alvin Buchanan,
through a procedural rule Buchanan lost the protection of that substantive
holding. Instead, the state court summarily rejected Buchanan's claim that
his private, consensual sodomy was constitutionally protected."
Now that he was convicted and sentenced to several years in a Texas
prison, Buchanan appealed to the federal courts for relief. Yet when he did,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari and refused to hear his argument.' A
denial of certiorari in and of itself is not particularly suspicious; the Court
denies most applications for certiorari. However, given the history of his
case, the Court's action appears disingenuous and, arguably, hypocritical.
Despite the fact that Buchanan had convinced a three-judge federal .panel
of Article 524's unconstitutionality, the Supreme Court vacated that
decision based on a newly-created procedural rule that did not exist when
Buchanan achieved his victory in the lower court. The Supreme Court told
Buchanan that he had to go through the entire process of state court trial
and appellate proceedings before the federal courts would consider his
constitutional attack againstArticle 524. Yet, aftermaking Alvin Buchanan
defend himself against the criminal charges and face sentencing, the Court
then denied Buchanan the opportunity to make his (previously successful)
constitutional argument to a federal court.
Result: Unchanged. Procedural rules prevent challenge to Texas
sodomy law in federal court.
C. Texas's Transition From a Gender-Neutral to a Gender-Specific
Sodomy Law
1. New Penal Code
Beginning in 1965, Texas initiated a major overhaul of its entire Penal
Code. 5 In 1967, the State Bar appointed the Texas State Bar Committee
",See, e.g., McDonald v. State, 513 S.W. 2d 44, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974);
Lee v. State, 505 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (citing Pruett); Kemp
v. State, 464 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Langston v. State, 460
S.W.2d. 909, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
103 The court essentially defined the Sears sodomy as private. Buchanan, 471
S.W.2d at 404.
SBuchanan v. Texas, 405 U.S. 930 (1972).
105 Randy Von Beitel, The Criminalization of Private Homosexual Acts: A
Jurisprudential Case Study of a Decision by the Texas Bar Penal Code Revision
Committee, 6 HUM. RTS. 23, 29 (1977).
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on the Revision of the Penal Code ("the Committee") to draft a new Penal
Code, which the State Bar could then recommend to the Legislature. 6
Dean Page Keeton of the University of Texas School of Law presided over
the Committee comprised ofjudges, district attorneys, and criminal defense
attorneys."0 7 The Committee evaluated and debated the proposals of its
large staff of attorneys, academics, and law students.
On June 21, 1968, the Committee considered the staff's Report on
Sexual Offenses, as well as a proposed Chapter on Sexual Offenses.10 8 The
preliminary draft did not criminalize the private, non-commercial, sexual
conduct of consenting adults, whether homosexual or heterosexual.'
Several Committee members took umbrage at the proposal to legalize
private same-sex sodomy. One Committee member argued that Texas
police officers wanted private homosexual sodomy to constitute criminal
conduct because "the act itself is so destructive of moral fiber and so
insidious." '
On a five-to-four vote of the Committee members present, the
Committee rejected the proposal to decriminalize the private, sexual
relations of gay Texans. The driving force behind the Committee's decision
to continue to criminalize private, same-sex conduct was the Committee
members' strongly-held belief that, if they legalized such activity, the
Legislature would reject the entire proposed Penal Code.' The Committee
also voted to retain the criminalization of private, consensual same-sex
sodomy in order to drive gay Texans from the public sphere."' Committee
members feared that ifthe adult gay subculture were visible, then homosex-
uality could be become more acceptable and younger people might not be
sufficiently deterred from engaging in same-sex conduct."' So, the
Committee decided to decriminalize only opposite-sex sodomy and to make
same-sex sodomy a gross misdemeanor." 4 Over the next two years, the
106 Id
..
7 For more on the role and composition of the Committee's staff, see id at 29-
30. Complete list ofimembership is in Page Keeton, Revision ofthe Penal Code, 33
TEx. B.L 511, 512 (1970).
1 Beitel, supra note 105, at 24.
Io6 1d at 25; see Page Keeton, Preliminary Draft: Revision of the Texas Penal
Code, Report on Sexual Offenses, Draft 2 (June 7, 1968).
"
0 Beitel, supra note 105, at 30 (quoting C. Glenn Conner).
I Id at 48-49.112 d at 44-45.
"I Id at 49.
14 Carol Vance proposed that private same-sex sodomy between consenting
adults be a gross misdemeanor. Id at 31 (citing Texas State Bar Committee on
Revision of the Penal Code at 31). Vance had served as the named appellant in the
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staff continued in vain to attempt to convince the Committee that the new
Penal Code should stay out of Texas bedrooms.
In October of 1970, the Committee published its first Proposed
Revision of the Texas Penal Code, which punished same-sex sodomy in
section 21.06. The proposed code classified same-sex sodomy as a Class
A misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum fine of $1000 and a maximum
jail term of one year."' Despite the apparent satisfaction of the Texas
District and County Attorneys Association with the frst proposed section
21.06, the 1972 Proposed Revision of the Penal Code made section 21.06
a Class B misdemeanor, which reduced the maximum sentence to six
months.
In 1973, the Texas Legislature debated the proposed changes to the
penal code, including section 21.06. Although some legislators favored
decriminalizing private, consensual same-sex sodomy, many legislators
feared that such a move could undo the entire reform effort and condemn
the new Penal Code to defeat. 6 However, the Subcommittee on Criminal
Matters of the Senate Jurisprudence Committee further reduced section
21.06 to a Class C misdemeanor, which eliminated jail time and limited the
maximum fine to $200. Section 21.06 was entitled "Homosexual Conduct"
and provided: "A person commits an offense ifhe engages in deviate sexual
intercourse with another individual of the same sex." Section 21.01 defined
"deviate sexual intercourse" as "any contact between any part of the
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person." The Texas
Legislature enacted the new Penal Code in 1973. Its provisions became
effective on January 1, 1974.117
For heterosexual Texans who engage in sodomy, the new Penal Code
represented a complete victory. By omitting any language that would
punish such acts, the code decriminalized all private, non-commercial sex
between consenting heterosexual adults.
For gay Texans, the penal reform did not appear on its face to represent
a significant setback over the old Code. The criminality of specific same-
appeal to prevent Johnnie Pruett from receiving "good time" credit for his time
served in jail pending appeal. See supra note 72.
"
5 Beitel, supra note 105, at 31.
d16 at 33-34. It is amazing that the hatred of some legislators towards gay
Texans runs so deep that these law-makers would sabotage a comprehensive eight-
year criminal law reform effort just to make sure that private, sexual conduct
remained criminal for gay people (but no longer for heterosexuals).
"' The new Penal Code also decriminalized fornication, adultery, and
seduction. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1150 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
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sex acts did not change under section 21.06.1 What was illegal under
Article 524 was still illegal under section 21.06."' But the ultimate
outcome was a mixed bag and, arguably, a setback for most gay Texans. On
the positive side, the maximum imprisonment for consensual sodomy was
decreased from a term of imprisonment up to fifteen years to no jail time
at all. As a result, during the transition period from Article 524 to section
21.06, some criminal defendants unsuccessfully tried to have crimes
committed under the old Code punished under the new Code. 20 But the
change in punishment did little to affect the average gay Texan. Most
sexually-active gay Texans engage solely in private, sexual activity with
another consenting adult. Reducing the punishment for sodomy convictions
was largely irrelevant because, as the Pruett court observed, it was
extremely unlikely that a person would be arrested and convicted for
engaging in private, consensual sodomy."2 With the diminished punish-
ment for sodomy, any defendant accused of forcible or public sodomy
would be prosecuted under different penal code sections that provided for
jail time and steeper fines."
The net effect of the new law was decidedly negative for gay men and
lesbians in Texas. While the reduction of private sodomy from felony to
misdemeanor status had little practical effect for most gay Texans, the new
law embodied a substantially different tenor than Article 524. Coupled with
the decriminalization of heterosexual sodomy, the new Texas sodomy law
became a specifically anti-gay criminal law. Entitled "Homosexual
Conduct," section 21.06 represented an explicit indictment of gay sexuality
and only gay sexuality.
This set up gay Texans for discrimination based on their presumed
conduct. Texas authorities used the new sodomy law against all gay men
and lesbians within theirjurisdiction, notjust against those individuals who
1.8 See Donoho v. State, 643 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)
("Though defined in simpler terms today the offense has remained substantively
the same since the Court began to construe the 1943 amendment.").
"' However, years later, the Texas legislature amended section2l.06 to prohibit
"the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another with an object." See Baker,
553 F. Supp. at 1151.
120 See, e.g., Komurke v. State, 562 S.W.2d 230,235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978);
Bishoffv. State, 531 S.W.2d 346,347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
1 The vast majority of reported sodomy convictions in Texas involved either
public conduct or forcible sodomy.
" Thus, for the incident of"public sodomy," Alvin Buchanan would have been
prosecuted under section 21.07, not 21.06.
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were caught, arrested, prosecuted, and convicted for engaging in same-sex
sodomy. For example, Texas police departments used the sodomy law to
deny employment opportunities to all gay job applicants." It should come
as no surprise that Texas police departments invoked section 21.06 to
justify discrimination against gay Texans. This was the intent of some
Committee members who drafted the new Penal Code and held "the basic
view that [gay men and lesbians] would either not be hired, or would be
hired only so long as they effectively hid their sexual orientation." 24
Courts, too, applied section 21.06 in contexts unrelated to traditional
criminal prosecutions. For example, courts have used the sodomy law to
revoke probations." Texas courts use section 21,06 to preclude gay
defendants from arguing the promiscuity defense to charges of sexual abuse
where heterosexual defendants are allowed to advance such a defense. 26 By
criminalizing same-sex conduct, section 21.06 also meant that (incorrectly)
calling someone gay constituted slander in Texas. 27 Immigration officials
and federal courts relied on section 21.06 to justify deporting otherwise
law-abiding gay immigrants.2 In sum, Texas courts noted that if a man is
a homosexual, he "is also a criminal under § 21.06 of the Texas Penal
Code."'"
Section 21.06 ultimately stigmatizes and injures gay Texans in myriad
ways unrelated to criminal enforcement ofthe law."30 Texas legislators have
cited the sodomy law as justification for cutting AIDS-related funding to
"gay-identified" organizations.' Legislators also invoked section 21.06 to
11 See City of Dallas v. England, 846 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. App. 1993);
Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134, 136-37 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
'
24Beitel, supra note 105, at 45.
12 See, e.g., Torme v. State, 525 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
' See Alston v. State, No. 2-90-1 10-CR, 1991 WL 18812, at *4 n.3 (Tex. App.
Sept. 25, 1991) (unpublished disposition) (citing Boutwell v. State, 719 S.W.2d
164, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)); Boulding v. State, No. A14-83-760-CR, 1987
WL 5191 (Tex. App. Jan. 8, 1987) (unpublished disposition).
" 
7See, e.g., Head v. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209,210 (Tex. App. 1980); see also
Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363,369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (calling someone gay
is "slanderous per sebecause [it] impute[s] to appellee the commission of the crime
of sodomy").
'
2 Seeinre Petition for Naturalization ofRichardJohn Longstaff, 538 F. Supp.
589, 592 (N.D. Tex. 1982).9Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1126 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
"
0 See Leslie, supra note 24.
131 See Michael H. Garbarino, Homosexuality and Texas Law: An Analysis of
Texas v. Morales and its Implications, 1 lEx. F. ON CIV. LIB. & CIV. RTS. 50, 51
n.7 (1994).
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justify excluding gay Texans from protection under the state's hate crimes
statute.132 The Texas Republican Party relied on section 21.06 to deny the
Log Cabin Republicans, a gay Republican organization, a booth at the
party's state convention. 33 Texas social workers invoked the state's
sodomy law in an attempt to prevent gay couples from serving as foster
parents.M Texas educators are instructedto teach Texas schoolchildren that
homosexual conduct is criminal.
135
The elimination of imprisonment for sodomy convictions failed to
mitigate any of these new enforcement mechanisms. Although housed in
the Penal Code, section 21.06 did not serve as a traditional criminal law;
rather section 21.06 was intended to-and did-serve as an off-the-shelf
mechanism to discriminate against gay Texans. Section 21.06 converted all
gay men and lesbians into de facto criminals. 36 Given the serious injuries
facilitated by the law, access to the courts to challenge the statute's
constitutionality became critical.
The legal arguments against section 21.06 would necessarily differ
from those launched against the prior sodomy prohibition. In Buchanan,
Pruett, andDawsonthe criminal defendants attacked the Texas sodomy law
as unconstitutionally overbroad. Each defendant (and, in Buchanan and
132 See David Todd Smith, EnhancedPunishment Under the Texas Hate Crimes
Act: Politics, Panacea, or Pathway to Hell?, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 276 n.49
(1994) (citing Christy Hoppe, Senate OK's Rewritten Criminal Justice Code: Bill
Would Stiffen Penalty for Hate Crimes, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 28, 1993,
at A18). Hate crimes protection is important for gay Texans because youth gangs
often explicitly target gay men in Texas for crimes of robbery and violence. See
Craig L. Uhrich, Comment, Hate Crime Legislation:,4 Policy Analysis, 36 HOUS.
L. REV. 1467, 1469 (1999).
131 See PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY FOUND., HOSTILE CLIMATE 101 (1997).
134 See Sam Howe Verhovek, Homosexual Foster Parent Sets Offa Debate in
Texas, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1997, at A20.
135 TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 163.002(8) (Vernon 1992) (stating
that sex education materials should emphasize "in a factual manner and from a
public health perspective, that homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the
general public and that homosexual conduct is a criminal offense"). See John A.
Russ IV, Note, Creating a Safe Space for Gay Youth: How the Supreme Court's
Religious Access Cases Can Help Young Gay People Organize at Public Schools,
4 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y& L. 545, 568-69 n.120 (1997) (mocking the absurdity of the
Texas statute).
Bakerv. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1126, 1129 (N.D. Tex. 1982). Although
some may respond that section 21.06 only proscribes specific acts, sodomy laws
conflate status and conduct, punishing the former in the name of the latter. See
generally Leslie, supra note 24.
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Dawson, the intervenors) essentially argued that the private, consensual
conduct of married couples was constitutionally protected and that article
524 reached this conduct 3 ' Such overbreadth arguments were inapplicable
to section 21.06 because the statute did not proscribe the sexual conduct of
married couples, or any other heterosexual couples, no matter how transient
the coupling. Accordingly, to challenge section 21.06 gay men and lesbians
would have to assert their own privacy rights or argue that the new sodomy
law violated their right to equal protection because it treated homosexuals
and heterosexuals quite differently.'38 Both positions had appeal. 3 9
However, the privacy argument appeared stronger.
As the Texas legislature revised statutory law, privacy jurispru-
dence-within and outside of Texas-was also undergoing significant
changes. The constitutional concept of individual privacy was maturing and
expanding. The original Buchanan decision had only Griswold to build
upon. By the close of the 1970s, federal courts had significantly enlarged
the concept of individual privacy. Eisenstadt v. Baird"4 had expanded
Griswold beyond the marital bedroom; -now unmarried individuals had a
constitutional right to privacy that encompassed the right to purchase and
use contraceptives.' 4' Roe v. Wade" and Carey v. Population Services
brought the right to obtain an abortion within constitutional privacy
guarantees. Similarly, Texas courts had also expanded its citizens' state
constitutional right to privacy. In 1976, the Texas Supreme Court opined
that underthe Texas Constitution "the State's intrusion into the individual's
zones of privacy must be carefully limited."'"
Although the Supreme Court significantly expanded the federal right
to privacy in connection with conduct most often associated with heterosex-
ual activity (e.g., contraception and abortion), the privacy rights of
homosexuals did not progress as dramatically. The bleakest spot of 1970s
,
37 See supra note 53 and accompanying text; Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp.
1320, 1322-23 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
'
38 See infra Parts ll.D.1-2, 5-6.
131 Sodomy law opponents could also argue that section 21.06 violated the
Establishment Clause, but this argument stood little chance of success. See Baker,
553 F. Supp. at 1145-46.
'
40 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
141 Id. at 453-54.
142 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
143 Carey v. Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678,684-85 (1977).
" Indus. Found. of the South v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668,
679 (Tex. 1976).
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privacy jurisprudence was Doe v. Commonwealth 'sAttorney.145 In Doe, the
plaintiff-who had been neither arrested nor charged with sodomy--
brought a declaratoryjudgment action in federal court to have the Virginia
sodomy law declared unconstitutional." The three-judge panel held that
the statute did not violate the federal constitutional right to privacy." The
Supreme Court summarily affirmed.14 ' Although the Court articulated no
reasoning and-by definition-was silent as to the basis for its summary
affirmance, Doe would complicate subsequent attempts in Texas to
challenge section 21.06's constitutionality.149
D. Constitutional Attacks Against Texas's Gender-Specific Sodomy
Statute
After the Texas legislature restricted the state's sodomy prohibition to
same-sex conduct, the Texas courts made it substantially more difficult for
Texans to challenge the constitutionality of the state's sodomy law.
Protecting the sodomy law from constitutional attack was primarily
achieved through the invocation-and, in some cases, misuse-of pro-
cedural rules. 50
1. Childers v. Dallas Police Department
Steven Childers sought a position as storeroom keeper for the Dallas
Police Department.' Although Childers had received high test scores on
14' Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975),
af'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
146 Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
147Id
148 Doe, 425 U.S. at 901.
141 See, e.g., Cyr v. Walls, 439 F. Supp. 697,701-02 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (stating
in dictum that "[t]here can be no doubt that such state sodomy and homosexuality
laws [like section 21.06] are constitutional") (citing Doe). See infra notes 157, 204.
o Even pre-reform defendants had difficulty challenging the Texas sodomy law
in some cases. In Taylor v. State, 482 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), Alvin
Ray Taylor pled guilty to sodomy and was on probation. While on probation, he
was caught shoplifting. When the state sought to revoke Taylor's probation, he
argued that the sodomy law that he had originally been convicted of violating was
unconstitutional. The court denied Taylor the powerto make the argument because
an "appellant may not rely upon errors which allegedly occurred at his original trial
on an appeal from his revocation of probation." Id. at 247.
'' See Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134, 137 (N.D. Tex.
1981), affd mem., 669 F2d 732 (5th Cir. 1982).
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the Department's aptitude exam152 and had earned positive evaluations,'
the interviewing sergeant denied Childers the position. Department
regulations precluded the hiring of criminals." In response to questions
during the interview, Childers admitted that he was gay. The sergeant
"based his decision on the fact that Childers was telling him that he was an
habitual lawbreaker."' 5 In federal court, Childers challenged the Depart-
ment's discriminatory employment policy on both First Amendment and
due process grounds156 and the constitutionality of section 21.06. Even
though the Department predicated its decision not to hire Childers on
section 21.06, the federal court invoked the procedural rules of standing to
deny Childers the ability to make his constitutional argument. As a result
of procedural rules, Childers was denied his full day in court.
Further, discussing the merits in dicta, the judge stated that "[w]ithout
an authoritative Supreme Court holding to the contrary, the Supreme Court
ruling in Doe, though summary, is binding on this Court." 57 This assertion
is flawed on several levels. First, the year after Doe, the Court itself noted
that it had "not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to
what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private con-
sensual sexual] behavior among adults."' Second, the summary affir-
mance in Doe was not binding with respect to substantive privacy rights be-
cause the Court's affirmance might have been based on standing grounds." 9
At a minimum, an open question clearly remained about whether the
decision in Doe was based on standing, given the huge number of
challenges to sodomy laws that courts refuse to hear based on standing.' 6
152 See id.
153 Id.
15 4 Id. at 144.
' See id. at 138 (quoting the language of the court).
1s6 ld. at 138, 143.
157 1d at 146 (citing Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,344-45 (1975)).
"s Carey v. Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977); see Baker v.
Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1138 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (explaining how this statement
reflected the opinion of six Justices that the summary affirmance in Doe did not
resolve the constitutionality of state sodomy laws), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc); cf Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 146 (incorrectly asserting that the
operative Carey language was only voiced by a plurality of justices).
"' See, e.g., Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1206 (1 Ith Cir. 1985), rev'd
on other grounds, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); People v. Onofre, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 954
(N.Y. App. 1980).
" See Leslie, supra note 80.
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Indeed, five years later, even the Supreme Court in Bowers did not rely on
Doe as precedent 16
1
Result. Procedural rule precludes attack on the Texas sodomy law's
constitutionality.
2. Baker v. Wade
Because the Texas sodomy law facilitated stigmatization, discrimina-
tion, and violence against gay men and lesbians, Donald Baker initiated
litigation in federal district court against local law enforcement authorities
to prevent them from enforcing the statute. 62 Baker sought a declaratory
judgment that section 21.06 violated three constitutional provisions:
privacy guarantees, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Establishment
Clause."6 The State of Texas intervened in the suit.' After the state's
intervention, the court-pursuantto Baker's request- certified a defendant
class of all district, county, and city attorneys in Texas who had responsi-
bility for enforcing section 21.06.65
Judge Buchmeyer took evidence from Baker and his expert witnesses,
a psychiatrist and a sociologist."m The judge evaluated the nature of
homosexuality; he noted the fact that homosexuality was not a disorder and
that the American Anthropological Association, American Psychological
Association, and American Bar Association had all adopted resolutions
supporting the repeal of state sodomy laws. 67 Thejudge found that sodomy
laws did not affect the incidence of homosexuality, but did injure homosex-
uals. The evidence at trial convinced Judge Buchmeyer that- even if
unenforced via criminal prosecution-section 21.06
result[s] in stigma, emotional stress and other adverse effects. The
anxieties caused to homosexuals--fear of arrest, loss ofjobs, discovery,
etc.-can cause severe mental health problems. Homosexuals, as
61 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 nA (1986) ("Petitioner also submits
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the District Court was not obligated
to follow our summary affirmance in Doe. We need not resolve this dispute, for we
prefer to give plenary consideration to the merits ofthis case rather than rely on our
earlier action in Doe.").
'2 See Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1121.
163 Id. at 1125.
164 ld
165 Id
16 Id at 1129.
167 Id. at 1129-30.
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criminals, are often alienated from society and institutions, particularly
law enforcement officials. They do suffer discrimination in housing,
employment and other areas.' 6
These injuries were sufficient both to confer standing on Baker to challenge
the law and to undermine the state's assertions of the statute's necessity. 169
After thoroughly analyzing the relevant case law, the origins of the
federal right to privacy, and all of the expert testimony presented, Judge
Buchmeyer found that section 21.06 was not supported by any "compelling
state interest"'f7 and held that the law violated Baker's constitutional right
to privacy.17 1
Addressing Baker's equal protection claim, Judge Buchmeyer first
observed that section 21.06 discriminated between homosexual and
heterosexual sodomy." 2 Under the rational basis test, the state had to show
that "the discrimination between heterosexuals and homosexuals bears
'some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.' "" The Dallas
District Attorney conceded that he knew of no rational basis for the
classification. 74 The court declined to determine whether Baker was
entitled to an intmediate level of review because section 21.06 failed even
the (traditionally weak) rational basis test. 75
Judge Buchmeyer rejected Baker's establishment of religion argument
against section 21.06.16 Nevertheless, the Baker court held that section
21.06 violated the U.S. Constitution because it infringed the fundamental
right to privacy and the right to equal protection of gay Texans.'"
After Judge Buchmeyer issued his opinion, Danny Hill, the district
attorney for Potter County, filed a notice of appeal from the district court's
invalidation of the Texas sodomy law. 71 Soon thereafter, the Texas
168 Id at 1130.
169 Id at 1147-48.
170 Id at 1143. Indeed, the court found that the law was "not even rationally
related to any legitimate state interest" Id Neither the Dallas District Attorney nor
the City Attorney could come up with any state interest furthered by the sodomy
law. Id at 1132-33, 1142.
17 Id at 1143.
7 Id.
" Id (quoting San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973);
Silva v. Vowell, 621 F.2d 640, 647 (5th Cir. 1980)).
17 4 Id. at 1144.
" Id at 1144-45; cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996).
176 Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1145-46.
'"See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
"3Baker v. Wade, 743 F.2d 236,239 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'don reh'g, 769 F.2d
289 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane).
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Attorney General filed a notice of appeal. 79 However, before the Fifth
Circuit took any action, the Texas Attorney General withdrew his notice." 0
A Fifth Circuit panel held that Hill, who was neither a named party nor a
class representative, could not intervene and prosecute the appeal."'
ApparentResult. The federal court enjoined all Texas prosecutors from
enforcing section 21.06. The Texas Attorney General-and the class
representatives-had decided not to appeal. That should have meant the
end of the Texas sodomy law. But the manipulation of procedural rules
would again spare section 21.06.
3. Baker v. Wade (Fifth Circuit en bane)
Despite the Texas Attorney General's explicit decision to drop the case,
the Fifth Circuit granted Danny Hill a rehearing en bane." Hill tried
unsuccessfully to have the Texas Supreme Court issue a writ of mandamus
to the Attorney General to force him to appeal the lower court's invalida-
tion of section 21.06.' That having failed, Hill next went to the district
court to intervene in the litigation and substitute himself as the class
representative.'" Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit panel rejected
Hill's persistent attempts to continue the litigation.'85
At this point, an en bane Fifth Circuit engaged in a series of procedural
machinations. First, a sharply divided en bane court allowed an appeal of
a district court opinion to proceed even though no party to the suit had an
appeal pending.' 6 Because Hill was not a party to the case when he filed
his notice of appeal, Hill had no right to appeal. 7
Second, the court manipulated the procedural rules of intervention.' 88
The Fifth Circuit had never permitted a party to "intervene" at the appellate
level when there was no appeal pending by the original parties who
179 Id
'so Id
'l Id at 244.
182 Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
!83 Id. at 291.
'" Id. Hill also moved to set aside the final judgment and to reopen the
evidence. Id at 294 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
'
85 See Baker v. Wade, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'd on reh"g, 769 F.2d
289 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane).
,"
6 See supra notes 180 and accompanying text.
187 Baker, 769 F.2d at 293.
" The majority acknowledged that the trial court should decide the issue of
intervention and the appellate court should only come in afterwards to review the
district court's decision. Id at 292. Nevertheless, after the district court had
specifically found that Hill failed to satisfy both the legal and factual requisite for
1138 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 89
litigated the case in the district court 8 9 Yet Hill was allowed to intervene
although the losing party had consciously abandoned its appeal. Even in
cases with an appeal pending, the Fifth Circuit had never allowed a non-
party to intervene on appeal if that non-party had been aware of the action
in the district court and had failed to intervene in the lower court.19
Although the previous Potter County District Attorney had been advised of
the opportunity to intervene in the litigation, he declined to intervene.1 91
Hence, Hill sought to intervene in a case that was effectively over. Perhaps
even more unorthodox and surprising was the Fifth Circuit's decision to
allow Hill's intervention in his own appeal even though he had no such
right.'I Hill's actions, in other words, amounted to an improper interven-
tion into an invalid appeal. Danny Hill was not a named defendant, not a
class representative, and had not tried to intervene until after the case was
over. 193
Finally, independent ofthe irregularities of allowing intervention given
the case's posture, the Fifth Circuit manipulated the procedural rules by
allowing Hill to intervene when he did not meet the basic requirements for
intervention. Hill had no personal interest in the litigation."9 The State of
Texas was the real party in interest because the case involved the constitu-
tionality of its statute.'" That should have been the end of the matter,
especially considering that the state would ultimately pay many of the costs
associated with the appeal." As the dissent explained:
When both the State's Attorney General and the class representatives
have decided that it is not in the state's interests to appeal, it is not the
province of any one of the 1085 district, county, and city attorneys of the
State to do so on the a priori basis that all others are out of step and that
he alone knows the state's true interest.1 7
intervention, the Fifth Circuit allowed Hill to directly intervene at the appellate
level in complete contravention of the established procedural rules. Id. at 295
(Rubin, J., dissenting). "A federal court of appeals takes no evidence, creates no
record, and decides no factual issues in the first instance. It is a court of review."
Id at 296.
189 Id at 296-97.
,90 Id at 297.
191 Id. at 294.
'1 Id. at 295.
193Id at 294.
194 Id. at 298.
195 Id
196 Id
197 id
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Ultimately, a newly conservative Fifth Circuit1 was so "[d]etermined
to uphold the constitutionality of a Texas statute whatever obstacles bar the
way, [that] the majority opinion trample[d] every procedural rule it
consider[ed]." 1  Examining the body of federal court challenges to the
Texas sodomy law, procedural rules seemed to be interpreted to disadvan-
tage gay litigants. The federal courts had interpreted procedural rules
strictly to keep gay litigants out of court,2 °° but interpreted procedural rules
broadly in Baker in an effort to allow anyone willing to come forward an
opportunity to eliminate a ruling that benefited gay Americans. The Baker
dissent noted the highly suspicious nature of the court's ruling: "If this en
bane decision is precedent, it assuredly rewrites the adjective law. If it is
not intended to be precedential, but only a special life-support contrivance,
undertaken for the one purpose of salvaging the [Texas sodomy] statute, it
denies equal justice both to the litigants before us and to those who, in the
future, will be denied equally extreme judicial measures.'' 2°1
In the end, the Fifth Circuit's procedural maneuvers served only one
purpose: to insure that openly gay Texans would not be treated the same as
heterosexuals. 22 There is little alternative to this interpretation given that
under the direction of the intervenors, the Baker "appeal and post trial
motions were characterized by vicious, bigoted and fraudulent attacks
against gay people, reminiscent of the racebaiting of earlier times."23
Given the aggressively anti-gay tone of all of Hill's papers on appeal, it is
all the more suspicious that the appellate court would distort the pro-
cedural rules in such an unprecedented manner to allow him to be heard.
198 Thomas J. Coleman, Jr., Disordered Liberty: Judicial Restrictions on the
Rights to Privacy and Equality in Bowers v. Hardwick and Baker v. Wade, 12
THURGOOD MARSHALL L. REv. 81, 101 (1986) ("By the time the case was argued
before the entire court, its composition had changed considerably due to the
appointment of six'conservative activist' judges by President Reagan, at least one
of which had engaged in homophobic political activity prior to her appointment.").
'9Baker, 769 F.2d at 293 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
200 See, e.g., Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex.
1981), aff'd mem., 669 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1982); Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F.
Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated and remanded, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
201 Baker, 769 F.2d at 293 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
202 Ironically, before the Fifth Circuit's rejection of privacy rights for gay
citizens, the Circuit had received national attention for its decisions protecting the
constitutional rights of disfavored groups. See Harvey Couch, A Brief History of
the Fifth Circuit Court ofAppeals, 56 TUL. L. REv. 948, 956 (1982).
203 Coleman, supra note 198, at 97 (citing Baker, 106 F.R.D. 526, 535-37,
538).
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After engaging in these procedural gymnastics, the court reversed the
district court's opinion and held the Texas sodomy law to be con-
stitutional.2 '
Result. Although section 21.06 appears to be invalidated once and for
all, the Fifth Circuit resurrects the fallen law by bastardizing procedural
rules.
4. Bowers v. Hardwick
Indirectly, Bowers v. Hardwickrepresented yet another challenge to the
Texas sodomy law.2°5 Just as the Supreme Court's decision in the Texas-
originated case of Roe v. Wade invalidated abortion statutes outside of
Texas, if the Supreme Court had decided Bowers differently, the decision
would have invalidated all sodomy statutes, including Texas's.26 But,
instead of reading the federal constitutional right to privacy to include
private, consensual same-sex conduct, the Court pulled the Constitution
beyond the reach of gay Americans.
In addition to a devastating defeat on the substantive legal issues,
Bowers also demonstrated the importance of procedural rules in litigation
affecting gay rights. Although the Georgia sodomy law condemned all
consensual sodomy, heterosexual and homosexual, the Bowers majority
limited the constitutional inquiry solely to same-sex sodomy.0 7 The Court
upheld the Georgia statute based largely on historical animus toward
homosexuality."' The Bowers majority mocked the notion ofa fundamental
2o4 Baker, 769 F.2d at 293 (Rubin, J., dissenting) ("The court's judicial spon-
sorship of Danny Hill as spokesman for the State of Texas is not only
unprecedented but ill-advised.").
The majority also made a critical mistake with respect to substantive law in its
deference to the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, which it stated was "controlling authority" on the constitutionality of
sodomy laws. Id at 292. The majority discussed no case law because it considered
"Doe to be binding upon" the court. Id The majority asserted that there could "be
no question but that the decision of the Supreme Court in Doe was on the merits
of the case, not on the standing of the plaintiffs to bring the suit." Id at 292. In
fact, the Court's summary affirmance of Doe may well have been based on the
Court's interpretation of the rules of standing. See supra notes 158-61 and
accompanying text.205Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
206 Of course, prohibitions against forcible sodomy, public sodomy, sodomy
with a minor, and commercial sodomy would still have remained valid.
207 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
=-8 Id at 191-96. The Court's reading ofthe historical record is flawed on many
counts. See generally Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political
Values: Searchingfor the Hidden Determinants ofBowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE
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right to commit homosexual sodomy.2° The Court was able to frame the
legal question as limited to "homosexual sodomy" because a married
heterosexual couple (the Does)-who had sought to intervene and
challenge the sodomy law as infringing upon their constitutional privacy
rights-was denied entry into the case based on procedural standing
rules.2 1° If the Does had overcome the procedural hurdle of standing, their
participation would have necessarily changed the entire tenor of the
opinion.
Finding the federal constitutional privacy argument foreclosed by
Bowers, opponents of section 21.06 adopted a legal strategy based on the
Texas Constitution."' Fortunately, after the defeats in the federal cases of
Childers and Baker, Texas privacy jurisprudence expanded in the 1980s.
Most importantly, the Texas Supreme Court found a right to privacy
embedded within the Texas Constitution.213 This provided hope that civil
rights advocates could convince Texas courts that section2l .06 violated the
Texas state constitutional right to privacy.
Result: Section 21.06 is insulated from federal privacy arguments. The
focus shifts to state courts and the Texas Constitution.
5. State v. Morales (Appellate)
The early 1990s witnessed two apparently successful challenges to the
constitutionality of the Texas sodomy law based on the Texas Constitution.
L.J. 1073, 1074-75 (1988); Eskridge, supra note 33, at 635-36.209 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
0 See Leslie, supra note 80, at 65 n. 189.
21 Although the Court's decision in Bowers would appear to make the
discussion about the procedural monkeyshines in Baker purely academic, if the
Fifth Circuit had not"trample[d] every procedural rule," Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d
289, 293 (5th Cir. 1985) (Rubin, J., dissenting), in its result-driven scramble to
maintain the Texas sodomy law, the district court opinion in Baker v. Wade would
have survived Bowers v. Hardwick. Bowers merely held that the federal
constitutional right to privacy did not invalidate state sodomy prohibitions as
applied to same-sex conduct. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. While this would have
overruled the privacy portion of the opinion, Judge Buchmeyer also invalidated
section 21.06 on equal protection grounds. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121,
1144 (N.D. Tex. 1982). Bowers would not have affected this part of the opinion
and the injunction against enforcement would have remained fully in place.212 See infra Part II.D.5-6.
213 Texas State Employees Union v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental
Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987).
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But in both cases, procedural machinations prevented these decisions from
actually invalidating the law.
In the state capital of Austin, a group of gay and lesbian civil rights
advocates ("the Morales plaintiffs") sought a declaratory judgment that
section 21.06 violated state constitutional guarantees of due process, equal
protection, and privacy.214 The Morales plaintiffs sued the state directly.
Following the defeat of federal privacy rights arguments delivered by
Bowers, the activists relied exclusively on the Texas Constitution.2"'
The Morales plaintiffs achieved two clear victories before the Texas
courts. The trial couirt held section 21.06 unconstitutional and enjoined the
state from enforcing the statute.21 6 On appeal, the state led with procedural
arguments and concluded with a substantive defense of the sodomy law.217
Procedurally, the state argued that courts in a civil action did not possess
jurisdiction to evaluate the constitutionality of penal code sections.218 The
appeals court rejected the argument and invoked the "well-recognized
exception [allowing review] ... when the criminal statute is unconstitu-
tional and its enforcement will cause irreparable injury to vested property
rights."219 The court found that the injuries inflicted by the sodomy
laws-including stigmatization, sanction of hate crimes, and encourage-
ment of discrimination against gay men and lesbians in employment,
housing, and other areas-constituted actual harm to gay Texans, including
the Morales plaintiffs." Despite the actual harm inflicted by the Texas
sodomy law, the state argued that an equity court could not enjoin
enforcement of a criminal statute. 2 ' The court rejected this argument
because of the inadequate remedy at law given the state's refusal, or
inability, to enforce the law through criminal prosecutions.'m In short, the
2"4 State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201,202 (Tex. App. 1992), rev'd, 969 S.W.2d
941 (Tex. 1994).
2 1 5 Id
216 Id.
2171d. at 202-03.
21 11d. at 202.
219 Id (citations omitted).
Id. at 203.221 Id.
= Id
Thus, appellees are confronted with this dilemma: They suffer actual harm
from the existence of § 21.06, harm that the State acknowledges, yet they
are unable to attack the statute's constitutionality because of the State's
apparent refusal to enforce the statute. Appellees, therefore, claim that they
lack an adequate remedy at law. We agree.
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state allocated most of its energy to the erection of procedural obstacles in
the path of civil rights advocates by asserting that gay Texans cannot argue
that an explicitly anti-gay law is unconstitutional and that judges did not
have authority to hear the advocates' claims or to act upon them.
Afterthe civil rights advocates cleared all of the procedural hurdles, the
Austin appeals court reached the merits of the constitutional argument?'
The state argued that Texas constitutional protections were identical to
federal constitutional rights? 4 As such, according to the state, the Supreme
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick disposed of the activists' claims.
But the appellate court noted that the Texas Constitution protected privacy
rights more broadly than did the U.S. Constitution. 5 In evaluating the
reach of Texas's constitutional privacy protections, the court concluded
that it could "think of nothing more fundamentally private and deserving
ofprotection than sexual behavior between consenting adults in private."
The court then explained that the Texas sodomy statute did not further any
compelling governmental objective? 7 With that, the appellate court
declared section 21.06 unconstitutional and affirmed the district court's
decision to enjoin the state from enforcing it."
Result- Section 21.06 appears dead.
6. City of Dallas v. England
Meanwhile, about 200 miles north of the state capital, another Texan
initiated her own battle against the Texas law? 9 The Dallas Police
Department, with its policy implicitly validated by Childers,-° continued
to discriminate against gay job applicants. As presumptive criminals, gay
Texans were forbidden to work in criminal law enforcement" 1 Thus, when
Mica England, a lesbian, applied for employment with the Department and
Id
=Id.
224 Id at 203-04.
221 Id at 204.
226 Id
I Id at 204-05. The sole objective advanced by the state was the protection of
"public morality." The appellate court methodically explained why this rationale
was insufficient. Id at 205.
mId.
z City of Dallas v. England, 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. App. 1993).
210 See supra Part II.D.1.
3' England, 846 S.W.2d at 958.
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answered truthfully when asked about her sexual orientation, the
Department considered her a criminal and refused to hire her, regardless of
her qualifications and aptitude. 2
England sued the City of Dallas, its police chief, and the State of Texas,
claiming that the Department's employment policy was predicated upon an
unconstitutional statute: Section 21.06. She sued to have the statute
declared unconstitutional and for injunctive relief to prevent the statute's
enforcement.23
The trial court held section 21.06 unconstitutional and enjoined the
City of Dallas and its police chief from enforcing the law."4 On appeal, the
law enforcement officials argued, as the defendants in Morales had, that the
court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of a criminal
statute. The court rejected this argument, as well as the appellants'
qualified-immunity defense. Reaching the merits, the appellate court relied
upon Morales and held section 21.06 unconstitutional."
Result- Two Texas appellate courts have ruled section 21.06 unconsti-
tutional. The statute appears unenforceable.
7. State v. Morales (Texas Supreme Court)
At the close of 1993, the legal landscape looked promising for gay
Texans. Two separate state appellate court opinions had held that section
21.06 violated the state constitutional right to privacy. The state's primary
anti-gay edict-a major source of discrimination-appeared dead. But,
celebration proved premature. Procedural sleights of hand-in Morales and
England-eliminated the thrust of both legal victories.
The state appealed the Morales decision and argued that the plaintiffs
did not have standing to make the legal argument that section 21.06 was
unconstitutional. In a five-to-four vote, the Texas Supreme Court reversed
the lower court opinion on procedural grounds."6 The Court opined
232 Id.
" Id Although she had initially sued for damages and attorneys' fees as well,
the trial court considered these inappropriate for summary judgment and it severed
these issues and assigned them a new cause number. Id at 958-59. Thus, the
litigation discussed in this Article concerns only the suit for injunctive relief
The trial court dismissed the state as a party to England's lawsuit. Id at 958.
s Id Although both the Morales and England decisions were issued by the
appellate court based in Austin, each panel had three different judges, for a total
of six appellate judges concluding that section 21.06 violated the Texas
Constitution.
16 State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994).
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that when acting as a court of equity it had no jurisdiction to evaluate the
constitutionality of a criminal statute unless the plaintiffs could show an
irreparable injury to a recognized property right. The majority then
reprimanded the plaintiffs for failing to create a record of discrimina-
tion predicated on section 21.06.1' Yet the Court neglected to note that
that part of the record was not developed because "[t]he State [had]
stpulatedthat plaintiffs' job choices are limited, that they face discrimina-
tion in housing, family, and criminal justice matters, and that they suffer
psychological harm to theirrelationships because they are labeled criminals
by the very existence of the statute." ' The majority ignored the stipulated
facts in the case, and then punished the plaintiffs for not having evi-
dence of these in the record. The facts were in the record; they were
stipulated.
The Texas Supreme Court's reversal in Morales magnified the
suspicion of many observers that the Texas courts were manipulating
procedural rules to reach their desired result."3 Two facts fueled this
suspicion. First, the Texas Supreme Court refused to give the plaintiffs
even the opportunity to amend their complaint or pleadings to show direct
injury. The Court instead remanded with instructions to the appellate court
to remand the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the
entire case for lack ofjurisdiction.24
Second, Texas Supreme Court justices are elected in statewide
elections for a six-year term of office. The elections are staggered so that
every even-numbered year, threejustices are up for re-election. Ofthethree
justices facing re-election in 1994, just months after the Morales decision
came down, two voted to reverse the appellate court and one to affirm.24
That was the margin of victory that protected the Texas sodomy law from
defeat.
After five years of litigation, two hard-fought victories, and immeasur-
able consumption of the civil rights community's scarce resources, the
Morales litigation ultimately resolved nothing. At the end of the race, the
Texas Supreme Court set up a procedural hurdle-one that the appellees
217 d. at 942.
238 Id at 953-54 (Gammage, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original).
239 See Garbarino, supra note 131, at 53 (noting that some individuals consider
the Morales opinion to be "'dishonest' and politically motivated").
240 Morales, 869 S.W.2d at 949.
241 The Supreme Court of Texas, 56 Tx. B.J. 817, 817-19 (Sept. 1993).
Justices Gonzalez and Hecht voted to reverse and Justice Doggett dissented.
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had cleared twice before in the same litigation-to prevent them from
successfully pursuing their appeal.
8. England Revisited:
Procedural Machinations Make Success Illusory and Fleeting
Even with the Court of Appeals's Morales decision reversed, the
Englanddecision remained. But the legal effect of England was not as clear
as gay advocates had initially believed. The England case solved the
standing problems that the Texas high court created in Morales. England
clearly had suffered employment discrimination because of section
21.06-an infringement of a property right adequate to create jurisdiction.
However, although the England court had held the Texas sodomy statute
unconstitutional, its decision did not prevent the State from enforcing that
statute because of a critical procedural maneuver the trial court had
dismissed the state as a party, allowing the suit to proceed against the city
and its police chief.242 England perfected an appeal to keep the state as a
party in the suit. The appellate court, however, affirmed the dismissal of the
state on sovereign immunity grounds.243 With the state no longer a party,
the reach of the case diminished significantly.2"
Because of the appeals court's ruling on the procedural issue, the
precedential value of the England opinion is uncertain. First, the Texas
Supreme Court's reversal in Morales on procedural grounds may have
undermined England. Although the Morales majority ofthe Texas Supreme
Court stated that it was not addressing the merits of England,245 the
England appellate court asserted that it had jurisdiction based on the
appellate decision in Morales.246 When the Texas Supreme Court reversed
Morales on precisely this ground, it begs the question whether the England
court had proper jurisdiction.247 Furthermore, subsequent courts have
questioned the continuing viability of England.2' Even the Dallas Police
242 England, 846 S.W.2d at 960.
243 I1
2 In contrast, Donald Baker brought suit against all city, county, and district
attorneys in their official capacities. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D.
Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985).
245 Morales, 869 S.W.2d at 942 n.5.
246 England, 846 S.W.2d at 958.
241 7 See Garbarino, supra note 131, at 52 (describing England as controversial
because "it relied in part upon precedent which was later dismissed").
24S Lawrence v. State, Nos. 14-99-00109-CR, 14-99-00111-CR, 2000 WL
729417, at *2 (Tex. App. 2000) (discussing City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d
464,470 (Tex. 1996)), rev'd, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001) (en banc).
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Department has apparently ignored the court's decision, choosing instead
to "retain the ... ban on hiring gays and lesbians."2 9
England may also illustrate how Texas courts invoke procedural rules
to avoid ruling on controversial issues, such as the sodomy statute. If
England's case had winded its way to the high court, then the Texas
justices would have had to reach the merits of the constitutional arguments.
The court could not duck the constitutional issue as it did in Morales. But
for procedural rules, England could have forced the Texas Supreme Court
to show its hand. Although the City of Dallas applied for a writ of error, the
Texas Supreme Court declined to hear the case, again invoking a proce-
dural hurdle. The Morales majority noted that the City of Dallas had not
filed a motion for rehearing with the court of appeals and that this oversight
was sufficient to prevent the state supreme court from exercising jurisdic-
tion over the case" 0 As a result of this combination of procedural rulings,
the England decision was limited to Dallas, and the Texas Supreme Court
never had to evaluate the constitutionality of section 21.06.
9. What Explains the Difference Between Morales and England?
In Morales, the trial court rejected the State's sovereign immunity
argument."' On appeal, the State waived its jurisdictional argument and
relied on its standing argument. 2 In contrast, the trial judge in England
accepted the state's immunity argument. 3 In England, the state knew not
to waive the sovereign immunity argument because it could not make the
standing argument (which eventually prevailed in Morales). The entire
basis of the standing argument was undermined in England. In Morales, the
State relied on the argument that none of these plaintiffs had suffered
adverse job consequences as a result of the Texas sodomy law despite the
fact that the State had already stipulated to the injuries inflicted by sodomy
laws.5 The State's argument did not apply to Mica England, who had
clearly been denied ajob opportunity.'
249 David A. Landau, Note, Employment Discrimination Against Lesbians and
Gays: The Incomplete Legal Responses of the United States and the European
Union, 4 DuKEJ. COMP. &INT'LL. 335,338 (1994) (citing Anne Belli, City Loses
Ruling over Gay Officers: Lesbian Claims Victory in Employment Case, DALLAS
MORNiNG NEWs, Feb. 11, 1993, at 33A).
m Morales, 869 S.W.2d at 942 n.5.
2s, See England, 846 S.W.2d at 960.
2 State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201,202 (Tex. App. 1992).
'
53 England, 846 S.W.2d at 960.
' See supra notes 236-38.
25 England, 846 S.W.2d at 958.
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Although it would have been more prudent for England's attorney to
sue the Texas Attorney General in his capacity as law enforcer, the attorney
had reason to believe that he could sue the state directly. The trial judge in
Morales had so held, and the State had essentially waived its sovereign
immunity in Morales by not pursuing the issue on appeal. 6 Furthermore,
the State had affirmatively intervened in the Baker challenge to section
21.06.M
In the end, these cases illustrate the same overriding theme: procedural
rules have become critical in gay rights litigation. Both cases present strong
gay plaintiffs who have initiated civil rights litigation and have persuaded
Texas state judges that the Texas sodomy law violates the state constitu-
tional right to privacy. Neither case was reversed on the merits. Yet, neither
case prevented the state from continuing to enforce its sodomy law and
from using section 21.06 to justify discrimination against gay Texans in
myriad ways.
E. Lessons from the Lone Star State
Gay rights advocates have been unable to get a full and fair hearing on
the constitutionality of the Texas sodomy law in either the Texas court
system or in the federal courts. The primary stumbling block has not been
inadequate substantive law but the manipulation of procedural rules. While
each individual procedural ruling may be defensible, taken as a whole, a
clear pattern emerges: courts appear to use procedural rules to protect the
sodomy statute. Texas courts have myriad procedural rules that prevent
litigants from challenging the constitutionality of the Texas sodomy law.
To insulate the Texas sodomy law from attack, courts-both federal
and state-have 1) invoked the Younger abstention doctrine; 2) applied
standing law to forbid sodomy law opponents from challenging the law; 3)
refused to hear appeals of those convicted under the law; 4) allowed non-
parties to appeal decisions against the sodomy law; and 5) violated
procedural rules regarding intervention. It appears that courts have lowered
procedural hurdles for sodomy law proponents and raised them for sodomy
law opponents.
Examining all of the Texas cases together, a clear pattern emerges: the
invocation of procedural rules has undermined every judicial decision to
invalidate the Texas sodomy law as unconstitutional. In Buchanan, a three-
judge panel held that the Texas sodomy law violated the U.S. Constitution.
21 Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 202.
1 7 Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1125.
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The Supreme Court vacated that decision based on the newly articulated
procedural rule of Younger abstention."8 Over a decade later, the federal
district court in Baker held a full trial and issued a comprehensive opinion
invalidating section 21.06 and enjoining its enforcement. 9 A new
conservative appeals' court majority manipulated a series of procedural
rules in order to reverse the lower court's opinion.2" In Morales, two lower
courts invalidated the Texas sodomy law as violating the state constitu-
tional right to privacy and the Texas Supreme Court reversed on procedural
grounds.26 At the same time, another Texas appellate court held section
21.06 unconstitutional but the impact of the opinion was blunted by a
procedural decision to dismiss the state as a defendant 62 Finally,
procedural hurdles have prevented other challenges from even getting off
the ground.263
This pattern lends itself to two interpretations. The strong hypothesis
would argue that courts manipulate procedural rules to protect the Texas
sodomy law. The Fifth Circuit's en bane decision in Baker presents the best
direct evidence of the strong hypothesis. Yet Buchanan (where a gay man
never received federal review of his conviction after the Supreme Court
vacated the decision invalidating the Texas sodomy law) and Morales
(where the Texas Supreme Court incorrectly applied standing doctrine)
represent reasonable supporting evidence of this hypothesis. While each
case taken in isolation may be defensible, taken as a whole, they represent
strong circumstantial evidence of manipulation.2'
See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
'5
9 See supra Part II.D.2.260
'espite the Fifth Circuit's reversal of [Baker], the district court's opinion
stands as one of the best expressions of the argument favoring a broad right to
privacy." Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy
in the Context of HomosexualActivity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 521, 600 (1986).261 See supra Parts II.D.5, II.D.7.
262 See supra Parts II.D.6, I.D.8.
2
' Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Childers v. Dallas
Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1981), affd mem., 669 F.2d 732 (5th
Cir. 1982).
264 Furthermore, state attorneys attempt to manipulate factual records in order
to take advantage of procedural hurdles. At the trial court level, the defendants
argued that Baker's suit "should be dismissed because no one is ever prosecuted
under [section 21.06]." Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
However, the defendants also stipulated "that cases involving violations of this
statute 'have been prosecuted by various assistant city attorneys and assistant
district attorneys' in Dallas." Id at 1126 (quoting parties' stipulated facts in final
pretrial order). Similarly, the State in Morales stipulated that section 21.06 inflicts
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The weak hypothesis would point to the pattern found in the challenges
to the Texas sodomy law and conclude that procedural barriers represent
a significant obstacle to gay citizens being able to use the judicial system
to secure their rights. The weak hypothesis would not argue that these
decisions are necessarily wrong or even inconsistent with the opinions
issued in non-sodomy cases. Rather, these cases only demonstrate the
difficulty of challenging the Texas sodomy law. The weak hypothesis may
also emphasize the importance of procedural rules given that attempts to
repeal section 21.06 have failed miserably.265 For example, while cam-
paigning to be the Governor of Texas, George W. Bush vowed to veto any
legislative attempt to legalize private, consensual same-sex sodomy.266
Instead of repealing section 21.06, the Texas legislature has expanded the
reach of its sodomy law to preclude more types of private, same-sex
conduct between consenting adults.26 7
This leaves only one way for gay Texans to get standing to challenge
the Texas sodomy law: Texas police must arrest someone for engaging in
private, same-sex sodomy with another consenting adult and Texas
prosecutors must break their tacit promise not to prosecute such conduct.
This is precisely the origin of the most recent challenge to section 21.06,
Lawrence v. State.2 6' Responding to a report ofa "weapons disturbance" at
a residence, 69 the police happened upon two men, John Lawrence and
Tyron Garner, engaged in oral sex in a private bedroom. When the district
attorney prosecuted the men for violating section 21.06, the defendants
pleaded nolo contendere and argued that section 21.06 violated the equal
protection and privacy guarantees of both the federal and state constitu-
tions. As to equal protection, the defendants contended that the Texas
sodomy law unconstitutionally discriminated with respect to sexual
orientation and to gender. The Texas appellate court held that--because the
penal code treated homosexuals and heterosexuals differently-the statute
violated the Texas Equal Rights Amendment. (Having so held, the court
declined to reach the defendants' privacy arguments.) But the victory was
short-lived. The Houston appellate court took the case en bane and
reversed, rejecting all constitutional attacks against section 21.06.,
a wide range of injuries against gay Texans. Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 203. Yet, on
appeal, the State argued that the statute was essentially harmless. See Morales, 869
S.W.2d at 943.
265 See Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1151.
GOP Gays to MeetBush Today in Texas, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 13, 2000, at A3.
" See supra note 119.
' Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001) (en bane).
21 Id at 350.
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Unlike in previous challenges to the Texas sodomy law, this loss does
not involve the manipulation of procedural barriers. While this Article
focuses on procedural rules rather than substantive law, and does not seek
to reargue the merits of the claims, a few brief observations reveal some
suspicious reasoning used by the en bane appellate court to uphold the
statute.
With respect to the equal protection claims based on sexual orientation,
the court reasoned that the Texas sodomy law-which proscribes only
same-sex sodomy-makes no classification based on sexual orientation
because people "having a predominately heterosexual inclination may
sometimes engage in homosexual conduct."2 0 While the court's assertion
appears disingenuous on its face, it also ignores how the Texas sodomy law
is used to condemn gay Texans regardless of their actual conduct. 7 Even
if someone with a "predominantly heterosexual inclination" would
theoretically be subject to prosecution for committing an occasional act of
sexual conduct with a person of the same sex., the sodomy law imposes its
primary burdens outside of criminal prosecution on gay people, not on
people with "predominantly heterosexual" inclinations.
Having concluded that the Texas sodomy law is facially neutral, the
court then held that sexual orientation is not a suspect classification and
that "the prohibition of homosexual conduct advances a legitimate state
interest and is rationally related thereto, namely, preserving public
morals."2 2 Indeed, because the legislature could advance a "moral
justification" for punishing homosexuality, the court concluded that its
"power to review... [the] legislative act is extremely limited."2' The
assertion conflicts with the Supreme Court's decision inRomerv. Evans, 4
which struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment that prohibited
localities from enacting anti-discrimination measures to protect gay
citizens.2'5
Discussing the equal protection claims based on gender, the majority
in Lawrence asserted that the Texas sodomy "statute is gender-neutral on
270Md at 353.
" See Leslie, supra note 24, at 168-77 (discussing how sodomy laws are
enforced against homosexual status); see also supra notes 123-35 and accom-
panying text (discussing how the Texas sodomy law is enforced against gay and
lesbian Texans in ways unrelated to actual conduct).
272Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 357.
"' Id. at 355; see also id at 355 n.16 ("Where a statute does not run afoul of
explicit constitutional protections, its moral justification is virtually unreviewable
by the judiciary.").
" Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).275See Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 376-78 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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its face.'276 Yet section 21.06 is the antithesis of a gender-neutral statute;27
the law criminalizes oral or anal sex only "with another individual of the
same sex."2 Whether or not fellatio constitutes a criminal act in Texas is
solely a function of the gender of the person performing the act. To reject
the defendants' claim that section 21.06, as applied, violated their right to
equal protection on the basis of gender, the court reasoned that, because the
law applied equally to male and female homosexuals, heightened scrutiny
was not appropriate. The statute survived rational-basis scrutiny, as it did
on the previous equal protection claim.279 The analysis is clearly at odds
with the Supreme Court's holding inLovingv. Virginia,28° where the Court
invalidated a state anti-miscegenation law on equal protection grounds.
even though the statute applied equally to white and black individuals. The
Lawrence majority attempted to distinguish Loving by asserting that the
Texas sodomy law was not "intended to promote any hostility between the
sexes, preserve any unequal treatment as between men and women, or
perpetuate any societal or cultural bias with regard to gender."2 ' The
court's supposition belies a fundamental misunderstanding about the role
of sodomy laws in perpetuating gender stereotypes.2 2 Ultimately, conduct
that is legal for women in Texas (i.e., performing fellatio) is criminal for
men and yet the state never had to demonstrate how this distinction was
"suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest."2'
Finally, inrejectingthe constitutional privacy arguments, theLawrence
majority failed to even mention those decisions that might interfere with its
mission of upholding the Texas sodomy law. Thus, in the Lawrence
opinion neither Morales nor England exist. While Morales was reversed on
procedural grounds,2 England is a valid decision of a Texas appellate
276 Id at 359.
277 See Leslie, supra note 24, at 110-12 (discussing the difference between
gender-neutral and gender-specific sodomy laws; noting that Texas maintains a
gender-specific sodomy law).278 TIX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1994) (emphasis added).
279 See Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 359 ("To the extent the statue has a
disproportionate impact upon homosexual conduct, the statute is supported by a
legitimate state interest.").
280 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
281 Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 358.
2 See Leslie, supra note 24, at 119; Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the
Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187, 228.
283 Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 357 (noting the legal test that would have been
applied if the court had applied strict scrutiny, as required by the Texas Equal
Rights Amendment).2 4 See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
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court.28 The en banc court in Houston tried neither to distinguish nor
undermine England; it simply ignored it. Looking beyond Texas's borders,
the Lawrence court cited favorably the Louisiana Supreme Court's recent
decision to uphold that state's sodomy law, but the majority failed to
concede that Louisiana is the exception. All other state appellate courtsthat
have addressed the constitutionality of sodomy laws in the post-Bowers era
have held that such laws violate state constitutional privacy rights," but
the Lawrence majority did not mention these decisions at all.
These observations support the hypothesis that some judges may
manipulate the law in order to preserve sodomy statutes. In the cases
discussed previously, procedural rules appear to have been manipulated to
insulate the Texas sodomy statute from review; in Lawrence, it is substan-
tive law that has arguably been manipulated. But that is an argument for
another day.
Lawrence and Garner have appealed their case to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals. The court has discretion whether to hear the appeal.287
Regardless of what happens on appeal, the Lawrence case demonstrates
the impact of the procedural manipulations in previous cases. If the Fifth
Circuit judges in Baker had not bastardized the procedural rules governing
intervention and appeals, then Lawrence and Garner would not have had to
endure the humiliation of arrest. If the Texas Supreme Court had not used
a weak standing argument to reverse the appellate court's invalidation of
the state sodomy law in Morales, Lawrence and Garner would not have
been forced to spend a day in jail.288 If the State had not been dismissed as
a party in England (or if the proper parties had been added), then Lawrence
and Garner would have been spared the onslaught of publicity about their
sex lives and the rigors of litigation.
Even if the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upholds section 21.06's
constitutionality, as a matter of substantive law, the legal battle against that
law would continue.2 9 For example, federal courts could still invalidate the
285 See supra Part II.D.8.
28 See, e.g., Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998); Wasson v.
Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112
(Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996).
2 See Tex. R. App. P. 66(2).
2 See Michael Baker, GaySex IllegalAgain: Court Overturns Sodomy Ruling,
TEx. TRIANGLE, Mar. 23, 2001, at 3.
289 Of course, if the court strikes down section 21.06, then that should be the
end of the story. However, it is possible that a clear victory in the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals could still be undone by legislative action. This is particularly
true if the court were to base its decision on equal protection grounds. If section
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law as violating federal equal protection guarantees, based on either sexual
orientation or gender-arguments that may have new vitality after Romer.
But procedural rules would remain a critical barrier to overturning the
Texas sodomy law. Even powerful substantive legal arguments are
irrelevant if procedural barriers prevent civil rights advocates from
advancing these arguments in court.
IMl. THE TEXAS CASE STUDY IS NOT ATYPICAL
The improper and inconsistent invocation of procedural rules to
foreclose gay litigants from pursuing their legal rights is not limited to
challenges to the Texas sodomy statute. While Texas courts have employed
a wide array of procedural rules, other states with sodomy laws have relied
primarily on standing doctrine to prevent citizens from attacking the
constitutionality of sodomy statutes in court.
By the 1990s, most states had eliminated their sodomy laws. The vast
majority did so during legislative overhauls of their state penal codes.
Nevertheless, over a dozen states maintain sodomy laws in their criminal
codes.2" As in Texas, these laws are used to facilitate a wide range of
discrimination against gay men and lesbians, including in employment,
custody decisions, and immigration.29 While Texas boasts the longest
paper trail of legal challenges to its state sodomy laws, most states with
sodomy laws have similarly imposed procedural barriers to protect their
statutes from constitutional challenge. In the post-Bowers era, when state
courts reach the merits of privacy arguments against state sodomy laws,
they generally strike down the statutes as violating a state constitutional
right to privacy.2' Nonetheless, most state courts in those states with
21.06 is unconstitutional solely on equal protection, the Texas legislature may make
statute constitutional by simply amending the law to include heterosexual conduct.
In contrast, if section 21.06 unconstitutionally infringes on the privacy rights of
Texans, the legislature could not undo the opinion through mere statutory
amendment; the Texas Constitution itself would have to be amended, a much more
arduous task.
' See Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REV.
359,480-82 (2001).
293 See Leslie, supra note 80.
2 See, e.g., Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998); Wasson v. Common-
wealth, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont.
1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn App. 1996); State v.
Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App. 1993), overruled onjurisdictionalgrounds,
869 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. 1994). In all of these cases, the state courts found that
the relevant state constitution afforded greater protection to privacy rights than the
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sodomy statutes have invoked standing doctrine as a procedural barrier to
preclude gay rights advocates from arguing that sodomy laws are unconsti-
tutional.
State courts consistently deny standing to challenge sodomy laws
unless the litigants before the court were arrested for committing private,
non-commercial sodomy with other consenting adults. This creates five
requirements to achieve standing: 1) an arrest for sodomy that was 2)
private; 3) non-commercial; 4) consensual; and 5) with another adult. If a
litigant fails to establish one of these five elements, most state courts will
preclude that litigant from arguing that the state sodomy statute constitutes
an unconstitutional infringement on individual privacy rights. Although
each element may appear reasonable at first glance, many state courtjudges
have employed them in a manner that effectively prevents anyone from
challenging the state's sodomy law.2' Some state courts appear to
manipulate these elements to insure that no one has standing to challenge
a sodomy law's constitutionality.
This demonstrates how procedural rules can be as important as rules of
substantive law in gay rights litigation. A favorable substantive law is of
little value if litigants cannot get into court and get a ruling on the merits.
CONCLUSION
Gay Americans have made substantial (though still partial) progress in
American courts with respect to the substantive law that protects the rights
of gay men and lesbians. This process, however, has increased the
importance of procedural rules that regulate access to the courts. Procedural
barriers that prevent gay litigants from making their substantial legal
arguments have become an albatross around the neck of many gay civil
rights litigants. Through procedural rules-unrelated to the substantive
arguments about the legal rights of gay men and lesbians-some courts
limit the ability of gay rights advocates to make substantive legal arguments
that stand a good chance of prevailing. For example, when post-Bowers
state courts reach the merits in cases challenging the constitutionality of
state sodomy laws, most state courts invalidate the statutes based on a state
U.S. Constitution.
293 See Recent Decisions, 15 DUQuEsNE L. REv. 123, 124 n.4 (1976) ("There
has been a lack of litigation on the issue of private adult consensual sexual
behavior due to the problem of standing. If an act is truly private, prosecution
would be rare or nonexistent. Force accompanying the conduct or public exposure
ofany kind invalidates a claim that the action is protected by the right of privacy.").
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constitutional right to privacy.2 This line of cases striking down sodomy
laws makes it more difficult for other state courts to uphold sodomy laws
on the merits. Given the strong criticism of Bowers v. Hardwick by
academics and commentators, as well as the steady stream of state court
opinions invalidating sodomy laws on privacy grounds, the least controver-
sial way for a state court to uphold its sodomy statute is to invoke
procedural rules that protectthe statute from constitutional attack. This case
study of legal challenges to the Texas sodomy law suggests that some
judges may interpret procedural rules in precisely such a manner. Histori-
cally, institutionalized homophobia and weak substantive law deterred
most gay Americans from pursuing their rights in court. Now, in many
instances, procedural hurdles represent a significant barrier to full equality
for gay Americans in our society.
' Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998); Wasson v. Commonwealth, 842
S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997);
Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996); State v. Morales, 826
S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App. 1993), overruled on jurisdictional grounds, 809 S.W.2d
941, 943 (Tex. 1994).
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